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For many years, scholarship covering the Napoleonic 
satellite kingdoms has centered on the overriding presence 
of Napoleon Bonaparte without looking a great deal at the 
kingdoms that supported him. Since the recent publication 
of Stuart Woolf's Napoleon's Integration of Europe the focus 
of study on these satellite kingdoms will change. Bavaria's 
history in particular needs to be examined, especially since 
a clear study will reveal much of Bavaria's modernization 
during these years was already underway before Napoleon 
assimilated it into his empire. However, much of that 
progressive policy would not have been enacted without 
Napoleon's protection. 
This project therefore will represent an attempt to 
show that the reform policies of Maximilian von Montgelas 
and his lord, Max Joseph of Bavaria, were well underway 
before the advent of the Confederation of the Rhine, that 
Napoleon's dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire was 
paramount to the success of Montgelas' policy, and that 
Bavaria's zeal for reform was tightly bound up with a new 
upper-middle class and was not a German nationalist movement 
as later historians have assumed. The answers to these 
questions will reveal much about the nature of reform and 
modernization in the German minor states and that the 
intellectuals of the early 19th Century had much less to do 
with these movements than is generally believed. 
This project will rest on primary sources from the 
1799-1815 period, primarily Montgelas' memoirs and much of 
the enormous material left by Napoleon Bonaparte and his 
ministers. Whenever secondary sources are used it will be 
the intent of the author to utilize primary quotations from 
within those texts as much as possible. 
In the end, it will be seen that the "revolution" in 
Bavaria owed much to Napoleon but not its existence. 
Likewise it will be clearly seen that these reforms were 
undertaken by bureaucrats and not on the whole by the 
supporters of German romantic philosophers, and that 
Bavaria's allegiance was entirely local and had very little 
to do with any drive for German unification. 
INTRODUCTION 
"Quod nihil sit tam infirmum aut instabile quam 
fama potentiae non sua vi nixa." 
--Machiavelli1 
It was neither sudden nor deliberate, yet, influenced 
by the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the coming 
of industrial power, there arose in late 18th-century 
Germany a desire to remake the German political landscape. 
A revolution of thought, at times scarcely evident to 
contemporaries, initiated Germany's movement toward eventual 
unification. The first signs of change were evident during 
the reigns of Frederick the Great of Prussia and Joseph II 
of Austria, enlightened absolutists who desired to modernize 
their state, to do away with irregular political borders, 
outmoded allegiances and institutions regulared by the Holy 
Roman Empire, the antiquated Reich. By the time of the 
French Revolution, a modern novus homo arose--bureaucrats, 
advisors, diplomats, and businessmen who espoused liberal 
modifications to the existing body politique. 
The Holy Roman Empire had been growing weaker since 
1648, and the 18th Century presented men of ability with the 
opportunity to crusade for a new government. Popular 
response differed from state to state. Prussia, moving 
7
"That nothing is so weak or unstable as a reputation 
for power that is not based on one's own forces." Niccolo 
Machiavelli quoting Tacitus, The Prince, (London: Penguin 
Books, 1961) 87. 
1 
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toward dominance in German affairs, readily embraced the 
"new man," utilizing the skills of such reformers in 
administrative posts. Austria, the conservative bulwark and 
champion of Holy Roman affairs, was less enthusiastic about 
the desires of such a class. In the minor states, however, 
these leaders would fundamentally and permanently alter the 
official order. They represented the political heart of the 
Aufklarung (Enlightenment), a drive for the removal of 
feudal ties and the superfluous institutions of Holy Roman 
Empire, the development of a bureaucratic state, and, in the 
south, the removal of the Catholic hegemony. 
Foremost in this revolt was the Electorate of Bavaria, 
fostered by her pro-French Elector, Maximilian Joseph IV of 
the House of Witteslbach and Pfalz-Zweibriicken, and led by a 
Savoyard minister, Max Joseph von Montgelas, the Elector's 
closest advisor. Assembling an ambitious group of 
reformers, Montgelas would assault the status quo with the 
tacit approval of his liege. Their designs were twofold: to 
modernize the Bavarian government and to assume a more 
powerful position in European affairs. Bavaria's social and 
economic circumstances created the need for reform. The 
country languished in feudal petrification. Finances were 
ruined by years of ineffective rule by nobles and clergy. 
Typical of European markets in those years, the economy 
rested on the twin pillars of agriculture and textiles. 
Neither received the attention they required from the 
3 
existing government, and both were burdened with outdated 
techniques and a Catholic refusal to allow more progressive 
Protestant entrepreneurs into the state. Montgelas' group 
wanted a complete renovation of the government and a 
reformation of church-state and church-society relations. 
Their capstones were advancement and recognition by merit. 
If a modern government could become a reality, then perhaps 
their second goal would be achieved, to rescue Bavaria from 
the international morass in which she was mired. 
Time and again in European history certain nations have 
been relegated to "second-class" powers. Bereft of the 
diplomatic, military, and economic power of the Great 
Powers, these states were rendered subservient and dependent 
on those nations which attempted mastery of the continent. 
The quintessential "second-class" power, Bavaria greatly 
desired to be her own master in European affairs. She had 
long played the pawn of foreign powers, especially in 
conflicts between Austria and France. Unable to muster the 
resources or reputation to influence the other powers, 
Bavaria's history is nonetheless a long struggle for 
legitimacy and for power based on her own internal 
stability, aggressive economy, modern government, and 
military force. 
The manner in which Bavaria accomplished this 
modernization on her own has been debated by contemporaries 
and historians. Daniel Klang opens his article "Bavaria and 
4 
the War of Liberation" with a discussion of Baron Stein's 
September 1809 letter to the German nationalist Friedrich 
von Gentz in which he declared his opinion that Prussia and 
all of Germany would prevail over Emperor Napoleon I and his 
Grande Armee. With Napoleon's fall, the petty princes of 
those minor states revolving about the French sun like 
mindless satellites would find their support and thus their 
legitimacy destroyed. According to Stein the French-
dominated Confederation of the Rhine was a paper tiger that 
lived or died according to the whims and successes of its 
French master. This prevalent view, Klang went on to say, 
dominated the histories of the period written up to about 
World War Two.2 Since that time, however, a historiographic 
reaction has occurred. Recent works, mostly by European 
scholars, posited that Bavaria's actions represented a grass 
roots movement among German reformers which would have 
occurred without outside influence. To whom the credit 
should go for the varied successes of reform, however, is 
blurred by the impact of the Napoleonic Wars and the massive 
social and political changes of that time. In the light of 
such recent works as Stuart Woolf's magnificent Napoleon and 
the Integration of Europe, the idea that Bavaria needed 
assistance for her reforms to succeed needs to be qualified. 
The issue of how Bavaria became a modern state and to 
2Daniel Klang, "Bavaria and the War of Liberation, 
1813-1814," French Historical Studies, vol. 4, 1965, 22-24. 
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whom the credit goes is not a clear case. Montgelas and his 
lord of course deserve great commendation, though the 
ambitious minister is certainly not renowned in his own land 
today.3 To their list of successes can be attributed the 
new bureaucratic administration, a reformed education 
system, a French-inspired but not French-initiated 
Constitution, and a program of fairly successful religious 
toleration, the cornerstone of the minister's reform. What 
they could not achieve on their own was the destruction of 
the Holy Roman Empire, which meant the Imperial circles, the 
Reichsritterschaft, and, most importantly, the Imperial free 
cities; the reform of the Bavarian army into a mobile, 
operational body capable of suceeding on the modern 
battlefield; the complete reorganization in geographic 
terms of Bavarian domains and their consolidation into one 
contiguous state; and, of course, a degree of legitimacy 
and strength in international affairs. 
In many aspects Montgelas' policy represented a 
successful revolt rather than a revolution. Missing was the 
crucial aspect of popular support of the masses, who instead 
showed overtly passive indifference to the changes in their 
land. However, true to the revolutionary rule of measure 
established by Crane Brinton in his magisterial The Anatomy 
3
"He was the friend of Germany's enemy and the enemy of 
Germany's religion," Klang, "Bavaria and the War of 
Liberation," 26. Klang notes that no prominent streets, 
parks, or government buildings bear Montgelas' name. 
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of Revolution, it was the disgruntled upper middle class who 
led the charge. The obstacles were great and, though the 
liberal leaders sometimes failed to act decisively, on the 
whole their work was a success. Indeed, the new Kingdom of 
Bavaria, which successfully if narrowly survived the tumult 
of the War of Liberation and the difficult beginnings of the 
German Confederation led by Prince Metternich after the 
Congress of Vienna, bore little resemblance to the backward 
electorate in the last years of the eighteenth century. The 
most remarkable achievement was perhaps the modern 
bureaucracy based upon advancement by merit. Yet if it is 
to be classified as a revolution it was an incomplete one, 
much more of a government and ecclesiastical reformation. 
The change was not complete; neither was it a democratic 
affair. But change it was, and the impact was not lost on 
the affairs of Germany during the next few decades. "If we 
judge them by what they promised," writes James Sheehan, 
...Montgelas, Reitzenstein, and the rest appear to 
be no more than qualified successes, but when we bear 
in mind their slender resources, the pressures imposed 
upon them from abroad, and the opposition they faced at 
home, the scope and significance of their achievements 
seem impressive.4 
The timing of this change was auspicious. Carried 
eastward by French bayonets, the ideas of liberte, 
fraternite, and egalite met with approval by the bureaucrats 
4Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989) 273. 
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in the burdened Mittelstaaten. Certain aspects of 
Montgelas' program would have gone forward without the 
French Revolution. Elimination of the church's temporal 
power, deeply embedded in the beliefs and practices of the 
citizens through Catholic control of education, stood as a 
major internal barrier to reform, one which could not be 
removed without external help. Some elements of land 
reform, such as the removal of the outdated tax system, 
could be enacted by a purely domestic policy. Justice, 
education, industry, and most importantly administration 
could have been improved within the borders of the 
electorate without fear of external interference. 
Nonetheless, Bavaria needed France, for more than simple 
support against hungry Austria, ever desirous of annexing 
Wittelsbach domains. No, the dreams of Max Joseph and 
Montgelas became reality only after the rise of Napoleon 
Bonaparte. 
Napoleon forced metamorphosis not only in domains under 
his immediate control but also in allied states. The 
changes introduced by the French conqueror allowed Montgelas 
greater potential for change. The liquidation of the Holy 
Roman Empire and its strangling system of obligations 
removed many obstacles. Acting as a catalyst for further 
action, it broadened the scope of Montgelas' administration. 
Church lands belonging to untouchable orders, such as the 
Teutonic Order or the Knights of Malta, suddenly lost 
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crucial foreign support, facilitating their confiscation by 
the Bavarian government. Imperial cities, islands of 
political disobedience and monuments to the lingering 
durability of the Reich, lost their legitimacy, as did the 
Reichsritterschaft, the Imperial nobility, but neither could 
be dealt with succesfully without Napoleonic influence. 
Thus Napoleon's role in the Bavarian reforms needs 
reevaluation. To be sure, military and economic demands by 
the French empire would ensure a degree of modification. 
The Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon's great eastern 
buffer of twenty-three major and minor states, would impose 
certain obligations, most of them martial in nature. The 
Code Napoleon would be put into effect with varying success, 
but Bavaria, like Baden, Wiirrtemberg, and Saxony, was 
allowed a great deal of leeway in governing its own affairs. 
Of great importance would be the Continental System enacted 
to stagnate the British economy. The ramifications of 
Napoleon's economic war would effect Bavaria more than 
Montgelas' own fiscal arrangements. 
In addition, it must be recalled that not all of these 
achievements came as a result of conscious action. 1813 and 
the dilemma Napoleon's defeat presented to French-allied 
Bavaria illustrates this well. Max Joseph's regime had 
associated itself with Napoleon in the first place as a 
course of necessity, demanded by French dominance, the 
encroachment of Austria, and Bavaria's inability to make 
9 
itself a first rate power. The War of Liberation presented 
a new problem, namely that the French conqueror was about to 
suffer defeat. Montgelas displayed impotence during the 
dilemma and only through the machinations of the Francophobe 
General Wrede and the policy of Prince Metternich did 
Bavaria forego a restoration. Royal policy certainly did 
not call for the realignment; it simply occurred. 
Montgelas' work offered the country a new international 
legitimacy. The state that emerged after the Congress of 
Vienna was not the one envisioned by Max Joseph and his 
ministers, but it would survive. 
So, the Kingdom of Bavaria, as it existed in 1815 at 
the close of the Napoleonic Period, owed its development to 
the ambitions of the new "nobility," the willingness of its 
monarch, the courage and determination of the Savoyard 
minister, and the indirect influence of Napoleon Bonaparte, 
his victories and defeats. Stein's accusations that Bavaria 
owed its existence to France, seconded by Heinrich von 
Trietschke's historical attack later that century, was not 
accurate, but neither did Bavaria do it all alone. The 
truth, as in many things, lies somewhere in between. 
There are dangers in establishing convenient 
chronological classification focusing on short periods of 
time. Nonetheless, to explain this initial stage of German 
"proto-nationalism," it is necessary to divide the reform 
movement in Bavaria into three distinct parts: 1799-1805, 
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the electoral period, 1805-1812, the royal period, and 1812-
1818, the reaction period and the War of Liberation. The 
latter period is outside the scope of this study, but the 
first two encompass the zenith of Montgelas' reform policy. 
The electoral period is characterized by massive and 
disorganized reforms and by external political affairs which 
involved two wars, the disentigration of the Holy Roman 
Empire, and the maturation of Napoleonic military dominance. 
The royal period is marked by more reserved and careful 
reform, a complete codification of those reforms, and the 
integration of Bavaria as the largest of the Napoleonic 
allied states. Both periods show Bavaria's inability to 
exercise relative independent action but also the 
establishment of a solid government system which allowed her 
to be the last German minor state to maintain her 
independence in the 19th Century. 
Chapter 1 
Bavaria before the accession of Max Joseph IV 
In those days, princes were not overworked mortals 
as they are today. Their crowns sat very firmly on 
their heads, and at night they just drew their 
nightcaps over them, and slept in peace, while 
peacefully at their feet slept their peoples; and when 
these woke up in the morning they said 'Good morning, 
Father,' and the princes replied, 'Good morning, dear 
children.' 
--Heinrich Heine1 
I 
The Holy Roman Empire 
In order to fully understand the extent of the 
successes and failures of Max Joseph's administration in 
reforming the Bavarian state, an overview of that which was 
to be overthrown is necessary. The Holy Roman Empire, 
outmoded and decayed though it was, stood at the heart of 
the matter. Years of increasing princely authority, 
enlightened thought, and bloody conflict sapped the vitality 
of the Germanic body. Changes in the very definition of 
European nationhood crippled the empire's ability to operate 
in the arena of international affairs. Since the Wars of 
Louis XIV, the modern state dominated European diplomacy, 
and the Holy Roman Empire was anything but a state. It had 
no true center, capital, or focus of unity. Sovereignty, 
'Heinrich Heine on the Holy Roman Empire, quoted in 
Jean d'Arenberg, The Lesser Princes of the Holy Roman 
Empire in the Napoleonic Era, dissertation, (Washington 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1950) 197. 
11 
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absolutist or enlightened, did not reside in a single person 
or office. Therefore, there could be no centralized 
position of strength from which the Empire could negotiate. 
Immutable, diverse opinions in law, justice, education, and 
military service sundered the councils which assisted the 
Emperor and the legislative bodies. The various member 
states, numbering over two hundred, were subjected to 
irregular boundaries and overlapping jurisdiction on the 
Imperial and local levels. In addition, the smaller rulers 
refused to follow the Emperor's lead. Thus, loyalty to the 
Reich was measured in partisan aspirations. 
The "constitution" of the Holy Roman Empire provided 
for the flawed foundation of the Reich. This constitution 
was in reality a conglomeration of policies, traditions, 
edicts, and negotiated settlements. It combined medieval 
caesaropapism, which no longer applied in many kingdoms of 
the Reich, with Germanic concepts of authority and 
submission. The "constitution" included such documents as 
the Golden Bull of 1356 (establishing the largely defunct 
electoral system), the Eternal Peace of 1495, the Treaty of 
Passau (1552), the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the all-
important Peace of Westphalia (1648).2 The de facto law of 
the Reich was also burdened by other less famous Imperial 
2John Gagliardo, Reich and Nation: The Holy Roman 
Empire as Idea and Reality, 1763-1806, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1980) 16. 
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proclamations, Papal Bulls, and local decrees. This 
ramshackle constitution was incapable of adapting to new 
forces unleashed by the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution. The inconsistencies and peculiar ideas defy 
easy historical summary and make comparisons with other 
states difficult if not meaningless. Ideas concerning the 
rights of the sovereign, his ties over the land, and the 
multifaceted legislation to which they were nominally linked 
were peculiar to Germanic law and cannot be easily 
translated. Embedded within the political ideology of the 
constitution and the Empire was the venerated concept of 
Herrschaft, defined by Otto Brunner as a type of authority 
combining political, economic, and social powers, embodied 
in the various political territories (Land or Lander) of the 
Reich, an authority located in the person of the lord, or 
herr. Such power belonged to each sovereign and was 
considered to allow absolute command over the citizens, 
resources, and wealth of the Land.3 From the Imperial 
throne to each duke or baron, herrschaft defined his 
absolute authority inside his own realm, at least in theory. 
The greatest herr, again in theory, was the Reichsoberhaupt, 
the Holy Roman Emperor. 
3Sheehan, Germany, 25; Otto Brunner, Land and 
Lordship: Structure of Government in Medieval Austria, 4th 
edition, (trans, from Land und Herrschaft by H. Kaminsky and 
James V.H. Melton), (Philadelphia: University of 
Philadelphia Press, 1984) 365-368. 
14 
Though his power was greatly curtailed, as head of the 
diverse institutions of the Reich the emperor still 
maintained some say over the procedures of the empire, 
usually with dubious effect. Between the years 1438-1805, 
the Austrian House of Hapsburg dominated the position. At 
the time of the French Revolution, the powers of the emperor 
remained largely feudal and increasingly weak. Income for 
the Holy Roman coffers originated from gifts at coronation, 
fines from the Imperial courts, taxes from the Imperial free 
cities, and payment for noble titles and feudal assessments. 
As John Gagliardo notes, the emperor was forced to depend 
upon his hereditary lands for necessary income. The 
disastrous, ephemeral reign of the single non-Hapsburg 
Emperor, the Wittelsbach Charles VII of Bavaria (1742-1745), 
markedly shows the weakness of this arrangement. Charles 
attempted a vast reorganization of the Holy Roman Empire, 
but Bavarian coffers were insufficient for the task and the 
attempt failed miserably.4 Intense partisan pressure from 
constituent states often led some emperors, such as the 
ambitious Joseph II of Austria, to consider giving up the 
crown altogether, since many Imperial responsibilities ran 
contrary to the interests of Austria itself.5 
4Gagliardo, Reich and Nation, 20-21. 
5Sheehan, Germany, 16. 
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The institutions through which the emperor could wield 
his ungainly and diminishing power remained ponderously slow 
and complex. The official legislative body of the Holy 
Roman Empire, the Reichstag, was convoked only by the 
emperor. Its motto, "Reichsrecht brecht Landesrecht,"6 was 
only rarely true by the time of the French Revolution. In 
fact, this body, though convened in Regensburg in the 
"Eternal Diet" (1663-1806), was, like the Reichsoberhaupt, 
hardly more than symbolic. Whatever vestiges of power it 
retained were hindered by its breakup into three maladroit 
councils, that of the Electors (Kurfurstenrat), the Princes 
(Furstenrat), and the Cities. The Kurfurstenrat, the only 
one to meet on a regular basis, consisted of the seven 
regular Imperial electors and was chaired by the Arch-
Chancellor of the Empire, the elector of Mainz. It 
consulted with the emperor and was responsible for his 
election. Wayward interests on the part of the members 
curtailed the group's effectiveness. Instead of personally 
attending, the emperor frequently sent his prinzipalkommisar 
and the electors sent envoys.7 The particular interests of 
the members often conflicted, making consensus an impossible 
goal. Local desires dominated; Imperial needs became 
secondary. Important decisions were argued by 
6Literally "Imperial law breaks territorial law." 
7Gagliardo, Reich, 22-23. 
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plenipotentiaries who cared more for their rank than for the 
issues which that rank allowed them to debate. Ambassadors 
entrenched themselves in local interests, sacrificing dying 
tradition for territorial freedom. 
A loose juridic system existed, but it too suffered 
from years of neglect. Two large Imperial councils served 
the emperor himself, the Imperial Cameral Tribunal, 
burdened in 1780 by over 60,000 backlogged cases,8 and the 
Aulic Council (Reichshofrat). The latter consisted of 
herrenbank (nobles) members of the gelehrtenbank, the legal 
community of the Reich. Intelligent, educated, made up of 
members of the most important noble families, the Aulic 
Council commanded respect despite its rather vague duties. 
The council largely replaced the Kurfurstenrat as the 
emperor's personal advisory body in the late 1700's, 
performing many legislative and administrative tasks in 
addition to hearing appeals from lower courts and the 
Imperial Diet. If, as James Sheehan proposes, all that 
remained of the empire was pomp and circumstance, a rigid 
adherence to symbolism which has been a time honored 
tradition among the Volk, the Aulic Council stood as the 
last bastion of Germanic belief in the Holy Roman Empire.9 
sIbid., 27. 
9Sheehan, Germany, 18. 
17 
Existing political boundaries complicated the 
administration of the Reich. Due to Germany's patchwork 
geography, a duchy would frequently overlap a neighboring 
barony, with some territory belonging to one herr completely 
surrounded by lands belonging to another. Imperial 
administrative districts, the eight Reichskreise or Imperial 
circles, combining legal, administrative, and financial 
aspects, along with medieval military commitments, 
complicated the existence of the Empire to the point of 
making any decisions of the Imperial government impossible 
to uphold. These circles held little or no resemblance to 
the geographical polities of Germany. Each had their own 
laws. Not only, then, would a duke find a town under his 
rule completely engulfed by lands of his neighbor but also 
his town may well have been included in an entirely 
different kreise, involving a completely new set of laws and 
codes by which he must adhere. Often such towns would carry 
on their own business, either heedless of the lord's wishes 
or ignored by him. Thus, from the top to the bottom, 
through law to geography, the Holy Roman Empire so chided by 
the caustic Voltaire was bereft of all physical substance. 
"Imperial institutions," wrote Sheehan, "were a labyrinth of 
overlapping jurisdictions and special privileges: they had 
18 
no well-defined center, just as the Reich itself had neither 
a capital nor a single source of sovereignty."10 
However, despite the fact that the Germanic body was 
unwieldy and outdated, the political symbols of the Holy 
Roman Empire remained important to certain elements which 
stood in the way of progress. Ancient institutions 
contained one viable characteristic, one reason for the 
continuation of the existence of the Reich: sanctuary. The 
old nobility, the conservative order which had so much to 
lose from the threatening tide from France, held onto its 
highly symbolic institutions far after they had become 
politically impotent. These were the only strongholds 
remaining to those who held dear, for personal reasons, the 
symbolism of the Reich. 
Two imperial traditions most deplored by ambitious 
minor states were the group of nobles known as the 
Reichsritterschaft, the Imperial knights, and the Imperial 
free cities. Noble families long ensconced in the network 
of the ancien regime, the knights included many landless 
barons and counts and in some instances owners of large 
tracts of land. The Reichsritterschaft found its greatest 
strength in the Protestants of the north. Split into three 
geographical groups, Bavaria belonged to two of these. The 
Franconian and Swabian knights numbered 360,000, owning 688 
10Ibid. , 15. 
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estates in Swabia and 702 in Franconia, thus making up a 
sizable portion of the population.11 
The fifty-one Imperial free cities attempted to make 
themselves an exclusive group, exercising vigorous laws to 
decide just who could live within their boundaries. Though 
they remained one of the emperor's only taxable citizenry, 
the rights and favors enjoyed by these cities far outweighed 
the responsibilities. They answered directly to the Aulic 
Council or the emperor and had greater leeway in regards to 
law and military service. The emperor considered the 
Reichsritterschaft and the Free Cities as his personal 
nobility, giving his empire, as it were, a certain 
viability. Both would hold fast to the lingering embers of 
the empire. Combined assaults by eager minor states and the 
burgeoning Napoleonic Empire would finally destroy them. 
Perhaps only the vague concept of nationalism, a 
nascent movement directed by loyalty to one's own state, 
could possibly have given the Holy Roman Empire the 
legitimacy it needed to stand the test. But the Holy Roman 
Empire was not true state, a prerequisite for the growth of 
nationality. Institutions and symbols did not suffice. In 
addition, the early reform movements exhibited more loyalty 
to the local prince than loyalty to Germany as a whole. The 
time of Bismarck, when for the first time many Germans 
nd'Arenberg, Lesser Princes, 14, 81-82. 
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thought of their state as a true embodiment of the Germanic 
spirit, was still far in the future. As it was, the growing 
loyalty representing the earliest forms of German 
nationalism, as expressed by Montgelas for Bavaria and 
Reitzenstein for Wiirttemberg, would be a primary factor in 
dismantling the Empire. Similar loyalties could not be 
fostered within the ancient institutions. Bavarians could 
no more want to be members of the Reich than members of 
"Germany." For the time, they were simply Bavarians, though 
proud of their German ancestry, just as Wurttembergers were 
from Wurttemberg and Saxons from Saxony. The Holy Roman 
Empire did not hold sufficient liberties nor efficient 
enough government to hold the loyalty of the German people. 
Because of this weakness, the Reich proved easy prey to 
Napoleonic imperialism.12 
12H.A.L. Fisher, Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: 
Germany, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903) 7-8; Heinrich von 
Treitschke, History of Germany in the 19th-century, 6 vols. 
(New York: AMS Press, 1968) 1:250- Michael Hughes states 
that the empire acted as an inhibitor to nationalism, the 
only thing that could, theoretically, save it. See Hughes, 
Nationalism and Society, (London: Edward Arnold, 1988) 29-
31. 
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II 
Bavaria before 1799 
Bavaria, as the third largest German state, stood much 
to gain from any possibility of change. The herrschaft over 
Bavaria belonged to the House of Wittelsbach, the twelfth 
ancient family of the Holy Roman Empire, founded in 1180. In 
1799, the electorate proper was, like many other German 
dominions, divided up into parcels of unequal size. 
Comprising nearly 1,2 00 of Germany's 12,000 square miles, 
Bavaria was the largest of the mittelstaaten. It contained 
around 2.1 million inhabitants, one-sixth of Germany's 
total. Bavaria as a political entity included Upper and 
Lower Bavaria, the Upper Palatinate in the Danube valley, 
the detached possessions of the Rhine Palatinate, and the 
Duchies of Zweibriicken, Jiilich, and Berg. The Wittelsbachs 
controlled both the Bavarian electorate and the Electorate 
of the Palatinate.13 Astride the primary military route for 
contending Austrian and French forces, Bavaria frequently 
found itself a battleground. The electorate's geographical 
13Maximilian Joseph Graf en von Montgelas, 
Denwiirdigkeiten des Graf en Maximilian Joseph von Montgelas 
uber die innere Staatsverwaltung Bayerns (1799-1817) (In 
French as Compte Rendu), (Munich: C.H. Beck'sche 
Verlagsbuchhanlung, 1908) 27-28. Montgelas' memoirs are 
contained in two works, the first covering foreign policy 
and the second concerning domestic policy. To avoid 
confusion, the second work will be referred to hereafter as 
Compte Rendu; C.P. Higby, The Ecclesiastical Policy, 14-
21. See also W.R. Lee, Population Growth, Economic 
Development, and Social Change in Bavaria, 1750-1850, (New 
York:Arno Press, 1977) 12. 
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position at the head of the Upper Danube gave armies access 
both to the Danube Valley and the Vienna region, the heart 
of the Hapsburg lands, but also parts of Upper Germany and, 
to the west, the upper Rhine River and Palatinate. Thus, as 
C.T. Atkinson declared, Bavaria could be "either Austria's 
stoutest bulwark or the most useful ally to her enemies."14 
The history of Bavarian foreign policy illustrates this 
point. Wittelsbach rulers carefully negotiated the line 
between the perils of independence and the incapacitation of 
foreign domination. The desire of the House of Hapsburg-
Lorraine, ruling from nearby Vienna, to annex the Bavarian 
lands is well-documented. On several occasions since the 
Treaty of Westphalia the Austrians tried to bring Bavarian 
lands under their control, seeking to augment the German 
speaking majority in Austrian territory and intensifying 
their involvement in German affairs. Bavarian rulers 
traditionally utilized alliances with France as protection 
against their powerful neighbors down the Danube Valley. 
Starting with Elector Max Emmanuel (1679-1726) and the War 
of the Spanish Succession, the 18th Century saw frequent 
treaties and alliances between the Bourbon nation and 
Bavaria. This "friendship" was strained at times, 
14C.T. Atkinson, A History of Germany, 1715-1815, (New 
York: Barnes & Noble, 1969) 3 64. Paul Bernard notes 
astutely that in the campaigns of 1703 and 1741 it was from 
Bavaria that Austria had been invaded. See Paul Bernard, 
Joseph II and Bavaria: Two 18th-century Attempts at German 
Unification, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965). 
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especially when Austria offered France its agriculturally 
wealthy and densely populated possessions in the Netherlands 
in return for the Bourbon's official nod on the annexation 
of Bavarian lands.15 
The jumbled lands under Bavarian authority were divided 
first into Rentamer, or Regierungen. These administrative 
districts were further subdivided into Pfleggerichte, which 
normally did not include cities, monasteries, or the lands 
belonging to nobles or knights. This arrangement made each 
Pfleggerichte irregular in shape, often completely engulfing 
cities and towns. The magistrate, or pfleger, was 
responsible for the levying of taxes, meting out justice, 
and policing his small sub-district. The government set 
their incomes at 1500 gulden per year, but their tax-levying 
ability allowed them to draw much more through graft. The 
electoral government had the theoretical power of assigning 
deputations to look for abuses, but the existing replacement 
system for the pfleggerichte made conviction improbable, 
lsIbid. , 25, 45-46, 121-127, 310, 438-439; Gagliardo, 
Reich and Nation, 69-71; On French-Austrian negotiations to 
exchange territory during the French Revolution, see Sydney 
Seymour Biro, The German Policy of Revolutionary France, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). Bavaria 
frequently looked to the Hohenzollerns of Prussia for 
support as well, causing alarm in France and Austria over 
the idea of a joint Hohenzollern-Wittelsbach domination of 
the Holy Roman Empire. 
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because the outgoing magistrate appointed a successor, who 
in turn was responsible for his prosecution.16 
Coupled with the economic limitations and the 
ineffective government was the Roman Catholic Church. 
Though the Reformation and the Thirty-Years War had done 
much to reduce the power of the Holy See in many corners of 
Germany, here, in the south, the Catholic church stood as a 
great edifice of conservatism, the symbol of the status quo. 
The ascendancy of the Catholic church remained as strong as 
in the time of Martin Luther. Indeed, in 1782 the ex-Jesuit 
Papal nuncio Cramer declared to the Pope that heretics had 
slipped into every part of Germany save Bavaria.17 Cramer 
went so far as to declare Munich a "German Rome."18 Each 
bishopric had its own rules concerning the education of the 
populace and the jurisdiction by which certain crimes would 
be adjudicated. A traveller in Bavaria declared "...he who 
could see things as they are, and would trace every intrigue 
back to its origin would find the first moves of the machine 
in a monk's cowl or a petticoat."19 Montgelas recalled 
16Higby, The Religious Policy, 30-32; Montgelas, 
Compte Rendu, 13-14. Some pfleger were Imperial Knights, 
doubling their protection from removal. 
17Higby, The Religious Policy, 34. 
18Harold C. Vedeler, "The Genesis of the Toleration 
Reforms in Bavaria under Montgelas," The Journal of Modern 
History, vol. X, no. 4, Dec, 1938, 474. 
19J.K.Riesbeck, quoted in Higby, The Religious Policy, 
474 . 
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Lors de l'avenement de votre majestie la religion 
catholique etoit exclusivement dominante dans les 
duches de Baviere, de Neubourg, du Haut-Palatinat, les 
possessions de la maison palatine en Souabe. C'etoit 
la seule dont l'exercice public fut autorise, dont les 
membres pussent exercer des emplois.20 
Various portions of Bavarian land fell under the 
boundaries of nine different diocese, none fully within the 
electorate. The Catholic clergy numbered 3,179 secular and 
3 700 parochial, discounting the great number of supplicants 
and monastics in the many monasteries and abbeys throughout 
the land. Some of these monasteries enjoyed rights similar 
to those of the pfleger: taxation, justice, and police.21 
Church and state were completely intertwined. Many 
clergymen held important posts in the government, and 
secular officials served on a series of ecclesiastical 
boards or colleges. The jurisdiction of these political 
entities varied. Some controlled education, others 
censorship, and others the economy. The Catholic dominated 
collegiate boards were in charge of mines, industry, timber, 
and the minting of coinage. These cumbersome councils were 
responsible to the elector as well as other allegiances, 
20Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 116. 
21Higby, The Religious Policy, 31, 50-52. These 
dioceses were those of Sulzburg, Passau, Regensburg, 
Freising, Augsburg, Eichstaedt, Bamberg, Chiemsee, and 
Constance. 
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such as to Rome or Vienna. Leadership was always divided, 
each member possessing an equal vote.22 
Catholic theology guided nearly everything. Though 
relations between church and state were at times strained, 
even during the reign of Karl Theodor, the sheer longevity 
of their power, cemented fast to the state by the Concordat 
of 1583 and amended by a long string of electoral edicts,23 
made the idea of reform a distant dream, embraced by a few. 
Just as in times past, Catholics remained skeptical of 
liberalism, the Protestants, and foreigners. The College 
for the Censorship of Books banned all works by Weiland, 
Lessing, and Frederick the Great.24 Catholic mythology, holy 
symbols and statues, and feast days predominated in every 
town and village. Leaders of the ancient faith prohibited 
freedom of the press and stifled economic growth by 
restricting ties with non-Catholic business partners. 
Education was the stronghold of the Catholic 
establishment. Though an Academy of Science had been 
founded in Munich in 1759 during the electorate of 
Maximilian Joseph III, most Bavarian schools lagged far 
behind those of neighboring states. Dogma and Catholic 
ideology dominated the curriculum. Local clergymen 
22Ramm, Germany, 1789-1919: A Political History, 
(London: Methuen & Co., 1967) 4-5. 
23Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 117. 
24Higby, The Religious Policy, 40-41. 
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responsible for the majority of the schools were underpaid 
and the schools poorly financed. An exasperated Montgelas 
wrote, "Ce systeme fit beaucoup de mal: 1'education avoit 
deja fait trop de progres pour qu'elle n'eut pas produit 
quelques sujets distingues.1,25 During the 18th Century, the 
Wittelsbachs fought a losing battle to encourage the 
citizenry to learn German properly, and it was believed that 
not all the people spoke the German language, much less read 
it.26 Some bishops attempted cooperation with the laity to 
bring about progressive education, but for the most part 
Catholics represented the past, out of touch with the 
evolving world. Hope of change remained distant. Karl 
Theodor, though no great friend of Catholics, helped foster 
a government in which they could remain in power. His 
policy in turn aided the Catholics in keeping out the 
Protestants who, though it must not be overstated, possessed 
ideas about education which were much more progressive than 
those of their counterparts. 
Catholic leaders continued to enforce the 1524 
decision outlawing Protestant faith in Bavaria. Punishment 
for heresy could be very stiff, with the guilty subject to 
fines, floggings, banishment, confiscation of property or 
25Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 121. 
26Hughes, Nationalism, 20. 
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even beheading and burning at the stake.27 It was believed 
only three official Protestants lived in Munich in 1799. 
The evangelical faith, where it existed, had to worship in 
private, usually in the homes of the small congregation. 
The construction of churches was forbidden. Safe areas, as 
established by Imperial law or by the whim of local lords, 
existed in the duchy of Sulzbach and the lordships of 
Pyrbaum, Ortenberg, and Sulzburg.28 Though many Protestant 
industrialists wanted to invest there, legal barriers 
prevented economic opportunity. Lifting of outmoded 
restrictions and loosening the hold of the Catholic clergy 
would be a cornerstone of Montgelas' religious reforms. 
Catholic hegemony weighed heavier on another group, the 
ever-persistent Jews of Bavaria. Since their expulsion by 
Albert V in 1553, their restrictions surpassed that even of 
the Protestants. More severe indictments, including heresy, 
were usually reserved for those of Jewish faith. Synagogues 
had to be carefully hidden in the private homes of 
individuals since public worship, just as in the case of 
Protestants, was prohibited. Most Jews could not even 
remain within Bavarian borders; those with business in 
Bavaria were issued a pass good for a few days or weeks. 
They were confined to ghettoes, except in Munich, but even 
27Higby, The Religious Policy, 34-36. 
2SIbid., 42; Vedeler, "The Genesis of Toleration..." 
474 . 
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in the capital their actions were carefully observed. They 
had to wear distinctive dress, were prohibited from public 
posts, most domestic jobs, and all guilds. They could 
neither buy, rent, nor sell land. To foster their diverse 
businesses, the Munich government allowed the peddling of 
their wares two days a week from specified inns across the 
countryside, and these merchants were subject to scrutiny 
and a demanding poll tax. Any effort to lift these 
restrictions before the accession of Maximilian Joseph IV 
had been forcefully denied.29 
Reform might have been possible under an enlightened 
leader, but until 1799 Bavaria never enjoyed such rule. 
From 1777 to 1799, Karl Theodor presided over this 
ramshackle arrangement. Succeeding his more moderate 
brother, Max Joseph III (1727-1777), this elector was 
disliked by the small, ambitious middle-class, the Hapsburg 
government yearning to absorb Bavarian lands, and the 
Catholics. The wavering leader seemed incapable of 
decision. Vergennes, France's minister for foreign affairs 
under Louis XVI, described Karl Theodor well: 
Although by nature intelligent, he has never 
succeeded in ruling by himself; he has always been 
governed by his ministers or by his father-confessor, 
or (for a time) by the electress; This conduct has 
increased his natural weakness and apathy to such a 
degree that for a long time he has had no opinions 
save those inspired in him by his entourage. The 
29Ibid. , 43-49; Vedeler, "The Genesis of 
Toleration..." 475-478. 
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void which this indolence has left in his soul is 
filled with the amusements of the hunt and of music, 
and by secret liaisons, for which His Electoral 
Majesty has at all time had a particular penchant.30 
Epitomizing the image of a decadent king, Karl Theodor 
was pompous and extravagant. He sold privileges and titles 
and became involved in all manner of licentious affairs. 
Despite a firm friendship with the Pope, he had frequent 
spats with powerful bishops within his lands. At the time 
of his death he had nearly bankrupted the state.31 And in 
many ways, the administration mimicked the vices of the 
elector. 
The Bavarian government was a leftover from medieval 
days, rife with corruption, controlled at all levels by 
petty nobles and Catholic leaders. Once again the political 
geography of the state crippled the effectiveness of the 
government. The Wittelsbach land was divided into three 
independent administrations: the Palatinate, Berg, and 
Bavaria proper. Within these three provinces existed a 
semblance of government function: a court of appeals, a 
presidential council, ecclesiastical colleges, minor courts, 
and a military establishment.32 Most important were the 
30Quoted in J.C. Easton, "Charles Theodor of Bavaria and 
Count Rumsford," Journal of Modern History, vol. 12, 1940, 
145-146. 
31
 Ibid. , 147; Higby, The Religious Policy, 74-80; See 
also Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 117-122. 
32Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 12. 
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executive and legislative bodies, which fell under the 
direct jurisdiction of the elector. Karl Theodor exercised 
his personal influence in the administrative councils in the 
Palatinate, for he hated Munich and only reluctantly went 
there to rule.33 
These councils met together under the suzerainty of the 
elector or his representatives to discuss matters of import. 
Karl Theodor's own administration, when it did convene in 
Munich, included a Minister of Finance, an attache-minister 
for affairs in Upper Palatinate, Neuberg, and Sulzbach, the 
Grand Chancellor of justice, police, and fiefs, a Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, and two ministers with no departments, 
nominally acting as advisors or special envoys of the 
elector.34 For military affairs there existed a council of 
war, though Montgelas records the multiplicity of domains 
and demands for fealty to the Imperial Circles made the army 
relatively impotent.35 The ministers met once or twice a 
week at the discretion of the elector. Most of the men 
33Easton, J.C. "Charles Theodor of Bavaria and Count 
Rumsford," 145-160. Though Karl Theodor was known as the 
Elector of Bavaria, the Electorate of the Palatinate was 
senior to that of Bavaria, and so, when he assumed the title 
in 1777, the electorate of Bavaria was absorbed into the 
Palatinate, where he spent most of his time. 
34Higby, The Religious Policy, 28. In 1778, this 
system of ministers had been revised to this arrangement, 
based on the idea of increasing the effectiveness of the 
ministries by allowing them to specialize in one area. See 
Ramm, Germany, 3-5. 
35Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 12. 
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appointed to these positions were friends of the elector, 
petty nobles or Imperial knights. Few possessed any 
experience or ability. The level of competence can be seen 
in the ex-Jesuit Father Lippert, one of the elector's 
closest advisors, whom Karl Theodor's cabinet secretary, 
Stephan von Stengel, described as "the most stupid, or 
rather the sole blockhead among all the Jesuits that I ever 
knew...a scandal mongerer of the first class and a most 
unblushing liar."36 
One exception, however, to this inept majority, was the 
British-born Benjamin Thompson, Count of Rumsford. As chief 
minister of Bavaria under Karl Theodor from 1784 to 1798, 
Rumsford was in some ways the vanguard of the approaching 
reform movement. Rumsford attempted some strategies that 
earned even Montgelas praise. The British minister focused 
mainly on domestic reforms, some of them albeit superficial, 
such as the expensive beautification program in Munich, 
embellishing the capital by building the Englische Garten 
and refurbishing older buildings in a vain effort to please 
Karl Theodor. However, Rumsford did help suppress 
mendicancy in the country and abolish usury. Most 
importantly, he created special work-houses to occupy the 
36Quoted from Higby, The Religious Policy, 30. 
37Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 14. "Le comte de Rumford, a 
cote d'une grande energie contre la mendicite et d'un 
etablissement en grand pour 1'industrie..." 
33 
poor. Though a far cry from a solution, these houses of 
industry helped lower the unemployment rate in the larger 
urban areas, an ever-present problem throughout the 
electorate.38 These were, however, of limited success. On 
the whole the ministers of Karl Theodor exemplified all that 
was hated in the ancien regime--greed, corruption and 
inefficiency. Their time of ascendancy was at an end. 
The political and social situation in Bavaria over 
which Karl Theodor presided did not exist in a vacuum. 
Around the far-flung lands of the electorate, great changes 
were afoot. The French Revolution and its sweeping ideology 
fostered an atmosphere encouraging to reform. The new 
government would waste little time harnessing the potential 
energy offered by the changing tide in Europe. And the new 
ministers who replaced the decadent advisors of Karl Theodor 
were visionaries of far greater vigor. 
38Easton, "Charles Theodor and of Bavaria and Count 
Rumsford," 155: Maximilian von Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten 
des Bayerischen staatsministers Maximilian Grafen von 
Montgelas, 1799-1817, (Stuttgart: Verlag der J.G. 
Cotta'schen buchhandlung, 1887) 17, hereafter referred to 
as Denwurdigkeiten. 
Chapter 2 
Pushing the Envelope: Bavarian reforms before 1806 
"We must deprive the Reichshofrat of the desire to 
exhibit its own impotence." 
--Freiherr von Gravenreuth1 
"Je ne veux pas prendre la Baviere, je veux la 
manger!" 
--Emperor Francis II to Ambassador 
Nogarola on the announcement of the 
Franco-Bavarian Alliance,2 
Karl Theodor's death and the confirmation of his 
successor ushered in a new era in Bavarian history. The 
first six years of Max Joseph's reign would see a revolution 
in government affairs on behalf of absolutism. In foreign 
policy, Bavaria rarely was able to influence events. The 
1799-1805 period saw the growing dominance of Napoleon's 
France; thus many of the changes enacted by Max Joseph's 
ministers necessarily occurred under a protective French 
umbrella. Internally, this period is characterized by rapid 
secularization of church lands and the permanent dissolution 
of Catholic ascendancy; rampant mediatization of minor 
states and aggrandizement of their territory; and a struggle 
against the recidivism of the nobility, the Imperial cities, 
and the Reichsritterschaft. 
Quoted in Klaus Epstein, the Genesis of German 
Conservatism, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) 
630 . 
2
"I don't want to take Bavaria, I want to eat it!" 
Quoted in d'Arenberg, Lesser Princes, 70. 
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I 
The New Government 
The succession to the Bavarian throne was not without 
difficulty. Just as at the death of childless Max Joseph 
III in 1777, the Austrians eagerly anticipated the demise of 
Karl Theodor, who in his many years failed to produce a male 
heir. Emperor Francis II greatly desired to accomplish what 
no other Hapsburg had, the annexation of the Wittelsbach 
lands. But the Bavarian house had many branches. From one 
of the smaller territories appeared the closest relative to 
the deceased elector, a man with a viable claim to 
succession, the Duke of Zweibriicken, Maximilian Joseph. 
An ardent Francophile, Max Joseph's background gave him 
ample opportunity to sample French civilization. Born May 
27, 1756, in the small town of Schwetzingen, he was the 
fourth child of the Austrian Field Marshal Frederick Michel 
Count of Birkenfeld. The father showed little interest in 
his son and shuttled him off to an uncle, Duke Christian IV 
of Deux-Points, the ruler of Zweibriicken. Trained in the 
schools of Alsace, learning both German and French, Max 
Joseph ultimately assumed command of a German regiment at 
Strasbourg, a unit itself subsidized by Louis XVI of France. 
Max Joseph took quickly to noble life, running up 
considerable bills for hunts, food, and clothing. "Le 
Prince Max etait un bourreau d'argent," wrote the Baron of 
Oberkirch. "Le roi Louis XVI avait paye ses dettes (a 
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plusiers reprises, dont 945,000 francs en 1788).... "3 The 
young army officer continued a successful if peaceful career 
with French and German units. He married Princess 
Wilhelmine-Auguste of Hesse-Darmstadt, with whom he had 
three sons and two daughters. After her death he married 
the anti-French, Protestant Princess Caroline of Baden, 
distantly related to both the King of Sweden and the Czar of 
Russia. Upon the death of Christian IV, Max Joseph became 
Duke of Zweibriicken on April 1, 1795. After Karl Theodor's 
death, the ministries and legal estates of the 
landschaftverordnete (the permanent committee delaing with 
the rights of herr and landrechte) upheld his claim to the 
Electorate of Bavaria. With great excitement he assumed the 
title of Elector of Bavaro-Palatinate, February 20, 1799, as 
Max Joseph IV, and quickly moved to Munich.4 
The new elector shared some of Karl Theodor's less 
respectable characteristics: love for the hunt, plays, 
operas, audiences with foreign emissaries, royal concerts 
and balls. He was vacillating at times, seemingly unable to 
focus his attention fully to the political matters at hand. 
When pressed, he wavered as long as possible, trying to move 
in the most advantageous direction at the right moment. 
3Marcel Dunan, Napoleon et l'Allemagne: Le systeme 
continental et les debuts du royaume de Baviere, 1806-1810, 
(Paris: Librarie Plon, 1942) 49. Dunan quotes Baron 
d'Oberkirch from his memoirs. 
4Ibid., 50; Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten, 8, 13. 
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Montgelas' accelerated reform programs, foreign affairs, and 
possibilities for land acquisition gave lease to Max 
Joseph's impetuosity. Despite the stabilizing influence of 
his wife, the elector remained true to the political 
traditions of the Bavarian state, looking to France whenever 
necessary for aid, leadership, and ideas. 
Max Joseph IV enjoyed a considerable rapport with 
Napoleon Bonaparte. Though the Corsican, ignoring his own 
ancestry, thought the Bavarian elector and his wife less 
than polished, he gave them the same courtesy he extended to 
the other monarchs of Europe. The French conqueror's 
portrait of the pair was, despite his own personal 
displeasure at the elector's opulent tendencies, fair and 
quite illuminating: 
The Queen of Bavaria was pretty. I liked very 
much being in her company. One day at the hunt the 
king had started off before me, and I had promised to 
follow him, but I remained chatting with the Queen for 
an hour and a half. That gave occassion for gossip, 
and roused the king to anger. When the Royal Pair met 
again, the King scolded the Queen. But she replied, 
'Would you have me throw the Emperor out the door?' 
From that time on I had to pay dearly for this 
gallantry; for the King and Queen followed me on my 
journey to Italy in the winter of 1807, and I had them 
always around me. They had bad carriages which used to 
break down every moment, and I was obliged eventually 
to take them into my own. In Venice they were also with 
me. At bottom, I was not vexed, for now I had royalty 
in my suit .5 
5F.M. Kircheisen, (editor), Memoirs of Napoleon I: 
Compiled from his own writings, (New York: Duffield & Co., 
1929) 126. Also quoted verbatim in General Baron Gourgaud, 
Talks with Napoleon at St. Helena (trans, by Elizabeth 
Wormeley Latimer), (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co.,1904) 150-
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Claude Francois Meneval relates another illuminating 
tale about the elector's nervousness. In late 1809, 
Napoleon, in celebration of his marriage to Marie Louise of 
Austria, invited Max Joseph and Caroline to Paris. While 
escorting the royal pair around Fontainebleu, privately 
touring the rooms built expressely for the new Empress, 
Napoleon led them into a dark, narrow flight of stairs, so 
close that the portly Max Joseph had to turn sideways to 
negotiate them. At the bottom, when no light was 
forthcoming and they stood in quiet darkness, the King of 
Bavaria suddenly cried out that there was going to be an 
ambush! Napoleon thought the entire affair very humorous, 
and the German prince's nervous exclamation did little to 
change Napoleon's faith in him.6 
Publicly, Max Joseph radiated his love for France. "I 
ask you to communicate to the Directory that they have no 
more loyal friend than I," the elector proclaimed to a 
pleased French ambassador. "On the occassion of every 
French victory, I feel like a Frenchman!"7 Events in 1813 
would later prove the limits of his loyalty as he led the 
mass German defection from the Confederation. However, for 
151. 
6Claude Francois Meneval, Memoirs Illustrating the 
History of Napoleon I from 1802 to 1815 (ed. by Baron 
Napoleon Joseph de Meneval), 2 vols. (New York: Appleton & 
Company, 1894) 11:268, 275. 
7Sheehan, German History, 262. 
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a time he would become one of Napoleon's staunchest allies. 
Such a friendship would pay handsome dividends. 
Max Joseph's popularity grew rapidly at home and 
abroad. He was affectionately called "le Henri IV bavarois" 
by his courtiers and political allies. Though not without 
enemies, especially in foreign courts, Max Joseph took great 
care to polish his image for his people.8 Desirous of 
changing the economic and social position of Bavaria, he did 
not have the patience, drive, nor, it would seem, the 
political nerve to do so. He was able, however, to pick 
excellent advisors, and fortunately there was a capable, 
industrious, and willing man with him who had the qualities 
to push ahead and effect real reform in the state. That 
adept administrator was Maximilian Joseph von Montgelas. 
Born September 12, 1759, to a minor Savoyard noblemen , 
and the Countess of Trauner, Maximilian von Montgelas would 
become both a revered and hated figure in Bavarian history.9 
Like his patron, Montgelas enjoyed a French education. His 
mother desired his entry into the clergy, but his father, 
8Dunan, Napoleon et l'Allemagne, 50-51. 
9Eberhard Weis, Montgelas, 1759-1799: Zwischen 
Revolution und Reform, (C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 
Miinchen, 1971) is the only real biography of Montgelas, and 
it does not cover the period of the Electorate and Kingdom 
of Bavaria. Another work covering most of his political 
accomplishments is an early work by Doeberl, Ludwig, 
Maximilian von Montgelas und das Prinzip der 
Staatsouveranitat. There are currently no English 
biographies of the statesman. 
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recently moved to Munich and serving as a Bavarian official, 
and who died a general in the Bavarian army, directed his 
son into politics. Montgelas studied at Freysing and Nancy, 
and upon his arrival at Strasbourg he enrolled alongside 
fellow classmates Metternich and Goethe in studies in 
diplomacy, history, and public rights.10 To complete his 
schooling he returned to Bavaria and the University of 
Ingolstadt. There he became loosely associated with the 
secret society known as the Illuminati, a covert liberal 
organization of scholars and bureaucrats desiring change in 
Germany. When this uncoordinated group was rooted out by 
Karl Theodor, Montgelas, himself only a minor member, was 
forced to flee. Too brilliant to remain unemployed long, he 
greatly desired to serve a Wittelsbach ruler, and so he came 
to Christian IV of Deux-Ponts in 1785, who employed the 
aspiring young politician as a minor official.11 Aware of 
Montgelas' talents, when Max Joseph took control of 
Zweibriicken he offered Montgelas a position as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. Montgelas also became the Duke's informal 
personal advisor. 
10Dunan, Napoleon et l'Allemagne, 55-56. 
nIbid., 56; Daniel Klang, "Bavaria and the War of 
Liberation," 25-26; See also the chapter in Weis, 
Montgelas, concerning his involvement in the Illuminati. 
Montgelas was never deeply involved and the society itself 
was not a threat to any current monarch. 
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The new minister's devotion to Max Joseph was absolute, 
even when his zeal for reform threatened certain aspects of 
his lordship's sovereignty. "Ein privatmann kann sich aus 
einer Notlage durch arbeit und Aktivitat wieder befreien," 
he wrote. "Fur einen entthronten Souveran weifi ich jedoch 
keinen anderen gesicherten Ort als das Grab."12 The two 
worked well together during their four years in Zweibriicken, 
conditioning their relationship for the task to come. 
Montgelas guarded his repartee with Max Joseph very 
carefully. An Austrian official, Steigentesch, wrote, "M. 
de Montgelas doit sa place et sa reputation a la paresse du 
roi et a 1'habitude qu'a ce prince de le voir toujours a 
cote de lui. Son grand but est le plaisir; c'est au 
plaisier qu'il sacrifie tout."13 
True or not, Montgelas had an ambitious mind and a 
driving personality. He was quick to embrace the ideas of 
the French Revolution. Montgelas "never failed for a moment 
to recognize that the young dynasty had everything to fear 
from the Hofburg and everything to hope from Napoleon 
Bonaparte."14 His goals, vast and challenging in number, 
revolved around the concept of total sovereignty, an 
absolute monarchy, invested in his patron, the Elector Max 
12Letter from Montgelas to Max Joseph, September 14, 
1798, quoted in Weis, Montgelas, 452. 
13Quoted in Dunan, Napoleon et l'Allemagne, 56. 
14Treitschke, History of Germany, 1:211. 
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Joseph. Outspoken, he often announced his zeal for change: 
"On commengoit a desirer, a parler meme ouvertement de 
reformes."15 To Montgelas the Holy Roman Empire stood as a 
monument of the dead past. Likewise the history of Bavaria 
gave testimony to missed opportunities. Thus he saw several 
obstacles to be overthrown before a progressive state could 
be constructed; the Holy Roman Empire and its institutions, 
the awkward and medieval constitution of the state, the 
nobility and their privileges, the entrenched position of 
the Catholic church, and the sluggish economy would be the 
foes he generally assaulted. The nobles in particular 
earned his ire. Their hereditary privileges, as opposed to 
the rights of middle class industrialists or the poor, could 
not, Montgelas believed, be justified in a modern state. 
To launch his revolution, Montgelas would need a 
qualified group of electoral ministers. Once ensconced in 
Munich, he wasted little time. Less than two weeks passed 
before all of Karl Theodor's entourage had been summarily 
dismissed. Father Lippert and the rest recieved their 
pensions and dismissals by February 29, 1799.15 An edict 
four days previous organized the Staatconferenz, 
establishing four ministries to run the electorate. 
Montgelas' chosen men were of the new bureaucratic elite 
15Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 102. 
16Higby, The Religious Policy, 102-103. 
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drawn from the ranks of businessmen, lesser nobles, 
entrepreneurs, lawmakers, scholars, and professionals. This 
class was just beginning to define itself through its hard 
work and support of capitalism, the exact ideals promulgated 
by the new Savoyard minister.17 The contribution to reform 
in Bavaria by the new ministers would be manifold. Their 
labor and dedication aided them in creating a working 
bureaucratic state. Their business and academic ties 
transcended the boundaries of the state, bringing in 
international trade and more dynamic ideals. Similarly 
their greatly pro-Protestant attitude encouraged the growth 
of a nascent, embryonic capitalism traditionally fostered by 
the evangelical faith. 
Montgelas assumed leadership of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Henri Thoedor, comte Topor Morawitzky, a learned 
scholar, former director of the Munich Academy of Science, 
and the youngest member of the Aulic Council in history, 
became Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs. Jean-Guillaume, 
Baron Hompesch-Bollheim, succeeded his own father as 
Minister of Finance. The amiable Hompesch would do much to 
streamline the budget and keep Max Joseph's spending within 
reason. Baron von Hertling became Minister of Justice.18 
17Sheehan, Germany, 142-143. 
18Dunan, Napoleon et I'Allemagne, 59-70, 258-260; 
Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 14-16; Vedeler, "The Genesis of 
Toleration..." 484-485; Higby, The Religious Policy, 103-
104. Montgelas reported the establishment of the 
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Besides these gentleman, Montgelas assembled an able 
bureaucratic staff, including the zealous religious 
administrator Frederick von Zentner ("the right arm of 
Montgelas"),19 the Francophile authors Karl Hans Lang and 
Christopher von Aretin, political theorist Joseph Hazzi, and 
agriculturalist Joseph Reingruber. The army came under the 
command of feldmarschall Carl Philippe von Wrede, Bavaria's 
most prominent soldier and an ardent Francophobe. Wrede 
usually displayed more courage than tactical ability.20 
Montgelas was also served well by Freiherr von Gravenreuth 
and Antoine de Cetto, his chief diplomatic attache and 
ambassador to France respectively. Though poorly organized 
at the outset, this able group immediately began to 
formulate a plan for change. 
The drive for change would attract many famous Germans 
to join the Bavarian revolution: Anselm Feuerbach, Karl von 
Savigny, Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling, Friedrich Niethammer, 
and G.W.F. Hegel among them. They came to Bavaria during 
the Montgelas period and made their enduring impression. 
Despite such able company, however, another man would be 
necessary to allow the consummation of Montgelas' plans: 
staatskonferenz caused more than a little murmuring among 
the nobility. 
19Vedeler, "The Genesis of Toleration", 484. 
20Philip J. Haythornthwaite, The Napoleonic Sourcebook, 
(New York: Facts on File, 1990) 364. 
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Napoleon Bonaparte. This point is a crucial one. Though a 
new bureaucracy was burgeoning and the government had begun 
to remove barriers to progress within Wittelsbach lands, 
international affairs and especially the Holy Roman Empire 
limited how far Montgelas could go. Crucial to his plans 
was the irrevocable destruction of feudal privileges and 
existing political boundaries. Geographically, Bavaria 
remained confined by the patchwork hegemony of Reichskriese 
and Pflegerrichte. He would be unable to fully implement 
the bureaucratic system he envisioned while they existed. 
Max Joseph was impotent in the face of even a very troubled 
Austria. No feasible plan of land consolidation existed; 
military action was out of the question. Austria, France, 
and probably even Prussia would not tolerate aggressive 
international action by the largest Mittelstaat; besides, 
Bavaria's military remained a hollow shell. 
Certain events between 1799 and 1805 would show 
Bavaria's inability, even impotence, in mastering the 
existing structure of German politics. Even before the 
creation of Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine, it was 
obvious that without the endorsement of France, certain 
goals could not be met, certain accomplishments would remain 
only possibilities. Therefore, especially during the first 
six years of Max Joseph's reign, events would come to pass 
that illuminated the necessity, if not the direct sanction, 
of Napoleon Bonaparte. 
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II 
Bavaria and European Affairs, 1799-1805 
The international sphere was such that the Bavarian 
leaders could not control their own destiny. In 1799, the 
existence of their state depended largely on events beyond 
their ability to influence. Political, social, and economic 
forces far more massive than any previously seen in European 
history moved across the continent. The French Revolution 
heralded an eventual shift of power from the nobles and king 
toward the influential entrepreneurs, industrialists, and 
middle class. The explosion of industrial power in Great 
Britain rang the death knell of agricultural Europe. Of 
utmost importance to Bavaria was Napoleon Bonaparte's rise 
to dominance in European affairs. To his meteoric success 
would the francophile Max Joseph briefly attach the fortunes 
of his kingdom. The association could be deemed on the 
whole a great success for Bavaria. The 1799-1805 
period, before the creation of the Confederation of the 
Rhine, illustrates Bavaria's need for outside assistance. 
This is not to say that French action is completely 
responsible for Bavarian success. It is also not to say 
that Bavarian leaders did not attempt to force a change. 
Often their actions brought them to precarious 
circumstances. In most of these instances, Max Joseph, not 
Montgelas, initiated the event. Ambitious and impetuous, 
the elector often recklessly forged ahead, disregarding even 
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the obvious consequences. His imprudence not only required 
a bailout by France but also assisted in instigating two 
wars. The first of these transgressions occurred before a 
full year of his reign had passed. 
In 1785, Duke William of Bavaria headed a secret 
commission charged with the difficult but necessary task of 
drawing up the plan for a Wittelsbach succession upon Karl 
Theodor's death. Without an heir, Karl Theodor feared 
Austrian annexation, thus William was named as the next 
elector. Max Joseph's claim, of course, superceded 
William's, but one part of the original scheme survived. 
William, in order to solidify his position in the face of 
Austria and the meddlesome church, was, among other things, 
to seize and secularize the possessions of the Order of 
Malta, long thought to be agents of foreign powers. With 
little thought as to the dangerous results of this action, 
Max Joseph pursued his predecessor's plan with great vigor. 
Four days prior to Karl Theodor's imminent death, Max 
Joseph's agents, in conjunction with officers of Karl 
Theodor's government, openly declared the Order of Malta 
abolished. All treasuries became property of the state, the 
commanderies were closed and not to be reopened, and the 
members exiled from the state. But Bavarian clout simply 
did not command enough respect for such a move and the issue 
exploded; the new titular Grand Master of the Order of Malta 
was His Majesty Czar Paul of Russia. Already contemplating 
the idea of joining the Second Coalition, Paul, angered at 
Max Joseph's impudence, threatened invasion. The elector, 
pressured by Austria for troop commitments to the coalition 
he did not desire to yield, feared being forced into the new 
war against France. The French naturally applauded 
Bavaria's independent action in defiance of Austria and her 
allies, but no support was forthcoming. Paul pitched his 
considerable military weight on the side of Great Britain 
and Austria. He subsequently declared Bavaria an enemy 
state to be treated as such upon the arrival of the savage 
Marshal Suvarov, currently ravaging French possessions and 
armies in Italy. With little hope of real French support, 
Max Joseph buckled. On July 12, 1799, an agreement with 
Russia reinstated the Order of Malta, all of its lands and 
possessions, and made the Bavarian Grand Prior a hereditary 
noble (the reprieve would last nine years). An intensified 
commitment followed; on October 1, 1799, a full treaty was 
signed with Russia and Bavaria became a minor ally of the 
coalition partners, sending 4,000 men to join Suvarov and 
Rimsky-Korsakov in the abortive Swiss campaign.21 This hard 
21Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten, 35-39; Higby, The 
Religious Policy, 107-109; Ramm, Germany, 108. The 
Bavarian army, a backward, ill-equipped, and poorly led 
force, did very little in the campaign. The main body of 
Bavarian troops did not see combat; it is assumed they 
moved slowly to prevent fighting against the French by order 
of the elector. Frequently in the campaign Suvarov and the 
allied commanders complained that the Bavarian division 
could never quite get into position in time. 
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lesson, however, made little of a lasting impression upon 
the elector. 
In the meantime allied fortunes turned sour. Hapsburg 
intractability greatly aided the cause of the French. The 
Austrian Hofkreigsrat, ever a thorn in Suvarov's side, 
continued to deny him supreme command on the field, 
withholding crucial unity of command from allied forces on 
the Upper Danube and Rhine Rivers. The delay doomed Rimsky-
Korsakov' s Russian army to disaster at the Battle of Zurich. 
Suvarov, and shortly thereafter Russia herself, withdrew 
from the war. The French Army of the Moselle under Moreau 
entered Bavaria on December 2, 1800, and at the Battle of 
Hohenlinden defeated the Austrians under the capable 
Archduke Charles. Combined with Napoleon's narrow yet 
decisive victory at Marengo in June, these two battles 
sealed the fate of the Second Coalition, securing French 
influence in Middle and South Germany for the next fifteen 
years. 
Suffering his second major defeat, the normally 
industrious Emperor Francis vacillated, hoping to delay the 
inevitable reparations of the upcoming peace negotiations. 
The humiliating Treaty of Luneville, signed by French 
ambassadors and Francis II himself, defined the nature of 
the French peace conditions and helped start the 
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entschadigungsplan, or the Prince's Revolution, which would 
cause the downfall of the Holy Roman Empire.22 
French involvement in the disintegration of the Reich 
began long before Luneville. The process accelerated by 
Luneville actually began at the end of the War of the First 
Coalition, when the Treaty of Campo-Formio called for 
negotiations for land annexations between France and Austria 
at the Congress of Rastatt. Proceedings were interrupted by 
the War of the Second Coalition, but the lingering affects 
of the Congress, which set in motion the mediatization of 
ecclesiastical and imperial states, would be aggravated and 
accelerated by newest round of negotiations. 
Napoleon, of course, wished to inflame whatever 
hostility the German princes felt toward the Reich. France 
traditionally had played Prussia and Austria against one 
another. Napoleon wished for more than this, and the Treaty 
of Luneville contained the embryo which would eventually 
become the Confederation of the Rhine. Prussia and Austria 
could continue to bicker, but a third party would 
undoubtedly weaken Germany as a whole, especially when 
backed by French military might.23 German reform parties 
22Ramm, Germany, 4 9-51. 
23The idea for a third force originated during the 
Directory at the insistance of Talleyrand and Abbe Sieyes, 
Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 26. The French 
Emperor did not originally see it this way. The interests 
of Czar Alexander in Germany were considerable, due to many 
Romanov relatives in various positions throughout the 
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represented a fertile ideological seedbed for such 
endeavors. Some German leaders already entertained the 
idea. A popular pamphlet issued by Count Bignon of France 
and Baron Waitz of Hesse-Cassel expressed the need for a 
Germanic federation, one that excluded Austria and Prussia. 
"Such a federation would be favorable to France, because it 
would act as a counterbalace against the two great powers, 
Austria and Prussia."24 If it developed, this group would 
theoretically owe its allegiance to France. France in turn 
would act as the "protector of these states," though as 
James Sheehan notes the distinction between allies and 
victims was "very subtle indeed."25 
empire; the elector's wife was one of these. Napoleon, in 
his on-going attempt to bring Russia to his side, at first 
thought Russia could be the third party, as Paul and then 
Alexander both expressed desire to arbitrate disputes in 
various German states. In this manner the gulf between 
Austria and Prussia would widen considerably. "By this means 
the German Empire will find itself in reality divided by 
two, for its affairs will be directed from two different 
centers. Assuming these arrangements successful, would the 
constitution of Germany still exist? Yes and no; yes, 
because it would not have been abolished; no, because its 
affairs would no longer be ordered as a whole and there 
would be more opposition than ever between Berlin and 
Vienna. Time and other considerations would then decide our 
policy." Napoleon to Talleyrand, April 3, 1802, quoted in 
Bruun, Geoffrey, Europe vs. the French Imperium, 1799-1814, 
(New York: Harper & Bros. Publishing, 1938) 116. 
24Quoted from Coup d'oeil sur la necessite de separer en 
Allemagne les interetes d'Empire de tout interete de 
Puissance et de donner au corps germanique une existance 
simple, une et independant, January 26, 1804, in d'Arenberg, 
Lesser Princes, 92-93. 
25Sheehan, German History, 253. 
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Napoleon and the German reformers thus seemed in 
accord; the outdated Holy Roman Empire needed change. The 
Treaty of Luneville was the first vehicle by which this 
would be achieved. Terms announced that Belgium, Flanders, 
the Imperial city of Liege, and nearly the entire left bank 
of the Rhine, including Wittelsbach territories of Julich, 
Berg, and most importantly the Palatinate, would become part 
of with France. In compensation for their losses, princes 
of the minor houses of Germany would receive indemnification 
from existing territories of the Reich, as stipulated in 
Article Seven of the Treaty.26 It also called for 
mediatization of ecclesiastical lands and the geographical 
consolidation of the larger states, the very thing Montgelas 
needed but could not achieve on his own. At Luneville the 
signatories gained peace at the price of tradition and 
symbolism; it was the death knell of the existing order. 
Minor states eagerly submitted numerous plans for 
redistribution. Bavarian delegates, on Montgelas 
instruction, suggested that Francis, as Reichoberhaupt, 
should propose a full plan for secularization and then 
withdraw himself completely from the process. Then on April 
20, 1801, through the Council of Electors, Max Joseph called 
for the Hapsburg ruler to negotiate as the presiding officer 
of the upcoming assembly. Francis, however, supporting the 
26Quoted in full in d'Arenberg, Lesser Princes, 54. 
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nobles, free cities, and ecclesiastical territories, desired 
to conduct the entire affair himself. The reichsoberhaupt 
resolved to defend as much of the Empire as he could. 
Although pressed by Napoleon and encouraged by other 
enthusiastic German princes, Francis refused to preside over 
the dissolution of the Reich.21 The process dragged on until 
Napoleon, with Czar Alexander's silent approval, attempted 
to solve the matter himself. A formal delegation of the 
Empire was charged with completing the mediatization. 
Representatives from Bohemia (a Hapsburg territory), Saxony, 
Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, Hesse-Cassel, the Teutonic Order, and 
the increasingly important Free-City of Mainz, led by Karl 
Dalberg, the arch-chancellor of the German Empire 
constituted the negotiating body. The decision of this 
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss, popularly referred to as the 
"Conclusion of the Empire," gave substance to the settlement 
conceived at Luneville. 
The decision of this assembly, pronounced February 25, 
1803, radically altered the face of German politics. One-
hundred twelve German states disappeared forever, duchies, 
baronies, counties, ecclesiastical lands alike. In the 
27
 Atkinson, A History of Germany, 456, Francis' 
pseudo-patriotic stand for the Reich had its limits; the 
bishopric of Passau, an important territory on the Inn River 
on the Austro-Bavarian border, was parcelled out between the 
Hapsburgs and the Wittelsbachs, and Francis had been adamant 
that Austria recieve their share of that area. See Ramm, 
Germany, 54-55. 
54 
resulting reorganization, Bavaria lost the Electorate of the 
Palatinate, the duchies of Jiilich and Berg, and the 
Principates of Simmern, Lautern, Veldenz, and Max Joseph's 
own Zweibriicken, encompassing 800,000 citizens.28 These were 
Rhenish possessions and most had been under French military-
rule since mid-1800. In return, Bavaria received two very 
profitable principalities, the bishoprics of Wiirzburg and 
Bamberg, along with fifteen Imperial free cities, including 
Ulm and Nordlingen, the smaller bishopric of Freysing, parts 
of (including the city of) the important arch-bishopric of 
Augsburg, and parts of Passau and Eichstadt. The total gain 
in citizens brought the electorate's population close to 
three million.29 The consolidation of Bavaria's borders that 
had been beyond Max Joseph's powers was accomplished through 
consular fiat. 
During this period Bavaria endured a tenuous diplomatic 
existence. Though defeated, Austria had not given up hopes 
28d'Arenberg, Lesser Princes, 69; Atkinson, A History 
of Germany, 461. See also Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten, 68-
72, 76, 83-86. 
29Ibid. , 69-70; Higby, The Religious Policy, 15-16; 
Atkinson, A History of Germany, 461. The new territories, 
in their entirety, were the Bishoprics of Wiirzburg, Bamberg, 
Augsburg (which maintained its free city status for at 
time), and Freysing; parts of Eichstadt and Passau; the 
abbeys of Kempten, St. Ulrich, St. Alfa, Gengenbach, 
Solfingen, Elchingen, Ursperg, Roggenburg, Wettenausen, 
Ottobeuern, Kaisersheim, and Waldsassen; and the Free 
Imperial Cities of Rothenburg, Weissenburg, Windsheim, 
Schweinfurt, Kempten, Kaufeurern, Wemmingen, Dinkelsbiihl, 
Nordlingen, Ulm, Bopfingen, Buchhorn, Wangen, Leutkirch, and 
Ravensberg. 
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of using diplomacy to reverse the results of the 1800 
campaign. The proximity of Hapsburg armies weighed heavily 
on the Bavarian administration, for France was still far 
away. True to his pro-French tendencies, Max Joseph 
instructed Montgelas to negotiate with France, seeking a 
protective alliance. The Austrians offered their own 
treaties, all of which involved the absorption of minor 
Bavarian areas and military obligations. On August 24, 
1801, however, Napoleon's ambassador to Bavaria, Louis-
Guillaume Otto, an accomplished diplomat, signed with 
Bavarian representatives an agreement on economic and 
political relations between France and Bavaria, including a 
significant monetary indemnity to Max Joseph.30 Austrian 
counter-proposals followed, but Bavaria successfully avoided 
them. France and Austria nearly came to blows again during 
this period. In 1802, with the Reichsdeputation's decision 
imminent, Max Joseph took another step which nearly 
embroiled his domain in war. Once more, he was merely 
following a policy that defined his agenda, but once more 
events made manifest the fact that Bavarian liberties had 
their limitations. The issue in question was the fate of 
the Reichsritterschaft. 
With the impending revisions to German political 
geography, the "Immediate Imperial Nobility," or 
30Deutsch, Harold C. the Genesis of Napoleonic 
Imperialism, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 193 8) 44. 
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Reichsunmittelbarkeit, became keenly aware that if the 
Imperial cities and the ecclesiastical states could be 
mediatized, then their own situation was rapidly becoming 
desperate. Led by Karl Freiherr von Gemmingen, a Prussian, 
the knights desperately sought answers to their dilemma.31 
Refuge was becoming scarce; most German states were 
discarding old allegiances and the knights had no place in 
the new order. Prussia had launched the initial assault on 
the Imperial nobility as early as 1796. Following their 
lead, Max Joseph's regime decided the time was right to 
emulate Hardenberg and the Berlin reformers. Sovereignty 
and the legitimacy of the elector's regime motivated this 
move. Montgelas believed the mere presence of the knights 
to be symbolic of a dead past.32 More banal, practical 
motives guided the reformers as well. As in the case of 
secularizing church lands, there were a large number of 
wealthy estates which stood to be gained. 
The attack on the Reichsritterschaft transpired in 
three interwoven stages. Many knights owed allegiance to 
bishoprics in Franconia, which in 1803 suddenly became 
Bavarian property and were subject to the reformers policy 
31Epstein, Klaus. The Genesis of German Conservatism, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) 628. 
Gemmingen resorted to ordering his Paris representative, von 
Wachter, to (successfully) utilize bribes to aid their 
cause. Talleyrand's advisors on German affairs, St. Foy and 
Durand, were known to be in Gemmingen's pocket. 
32Montgelas, Denwiirtigkeiten, 77. 
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of dismantling religious corporations. Max Joseph ordered 
the seizure of some knightly possessions. During this time, 
in one of the outlying cantons, a former official from 
Weimar and knight of the empire, August von Kalb, facing the 
loss of his lands to either his brother-in-law (as a result 
of a lengthy lawsuit) or to the eager Bavarian government, 
decided that he would sell the Von Kalb lands to Bavaria in 
exchange for a considerable payment. At once, Franconian 
officials, not yet under Bavarian jurisdiction, appealed to 
Francis, contending that no knight could arbitrarily give up 
his obligations to the Empire. Francis replied at once: 
In view of the most dangerous consequences, which 
the imitation of the conduct of the Kalb brothers would 
involve for out Imperial prerogatives and the entire 
constitution of the Reichsritterschaft, it is incumbant 
on me to warn you, the members of the Franconian 
Reichsritterschaft...against such conduct as contrary 
to all principles of honor and duty...I command you, 
upon pain of our Imperial displeasure, and the 
certainity of severe punishment, to scrupulouly 
observe and fulfill all obligations owed to the 
knightly order and to ourselves as your oberhaupt.33 
Max Joseph responded by appointing Count Friedrich of 
Thtirheim to an ad hoc post with the responsibility of 
disabling the knights through harassment and monetary 
inducements. On October 9, 1803, an electoral edict 
renounced all knightly jurisdiction, though land and homes 
33Declaration of Francis II, May 16, 1803, quoted in 
full in Epstein, The Genesis of German Conservatism, 62 9 
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would not be taken.34 Some knights succumbed to the bribes 
and preferments. When others did not, Max Joseph moved 
swiftly, despite his promises of leniency. Bavarian 
infantry moved out into the countryside; negotiations now 
involved frontal assaults on private castles and minor 
skirmishes in the field. Houses were ramsacked, furniture, 
paintings, and personal possessions stolen or destroyed. 
Land and manors were occupied.35 Before the von Kalb issue 
was resolved, Max Joseph sparked a second, more serious 
crisis. 
That same autumn, Bavarian troops occupied the eastern 
principality of Oberhausen on the Austro-Bavarian border, 
occupying the houses of the local knights. Tempers were 
already high over the division of Passau and the von Kalb 
action. This further act of naked aggression induced 
Francis to send his white-coated Austrian soldiers to the 
34The elector did not mince words. He declared "... sans 
doute la chevalerie avait existe comme corporation 
particuliere, mais que cependant elle n'etait composee a 
l'origine que de nobles dant du pays qui s'etaient derobes a 
la souverainete des princes. C'est ainsi que s'etaient 
eleves dans l'Etat de petits etats, dont 1'existence etait 
incompatible avec les droits imprescriptibels du 
gouvernement et le bien du pays. L'electeur se proposait 
done de remener la noblese immediate a sa situation 
primitive de noblesse sujett." Quoted in Alfred Rambaud, La 
Domination Frangaise en Allemagne; L'Allemagne sous 
Napoleon Ier, 1804-1811, (Paris: Librairie Academique 
Dider, 1897) 17. 
35Gagliardo, Reich and Nation, 230; Ramm, Germany, 61-
62; d'Arenberg, Lesser Princes, 82. Gagliardo says nearly 
half the knights accepted the monetary gifts and special 
privileges. 
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Inn River, the border between Austria and Bavaria. Philip 
Cobenzl, the chief Austrian diplomat, announced that 
military force was "the only language that Munich 
understood."36 Montgelas cautioned Max Joseph but, desiring 
his lord to stand firm, counseled him to hold his ground. 
Otto assured the alarmed Max Joseph that France would 
support Bavaria politically. However, in a moment of 
charactersitic hesitation, the Elector avoided the threat of 
war by evacuating Oberhausen. Austria considered this a 
major victory, and French emissary Champagny declared 
soberly: 
This (Austria's) satisfaction, which probably was 
her due and which she obtained by a menace , gives her 
a great advantage over Bavaria in the disputes which 
are born each day from the mixture of territories and 
the uncertainty of responsible rights. The affair of 
Oberhausen may become an argument which the stronger 
may recall the weaker, in order to establish all his 
pretensions .37 
Austrian celebrations ended abruptly when Max Joseph 
revealed that, despite his inability to hold ground in the 
international arena without (an sometimes in spite of) 
French support, Bavaria was not finished with this issue. 
Max Joseph initiated the third phase with a renewed, much 
more forceful attack on the Reichsritterschaft. The hasty 
elector was set on overthrowing all knightly power within 
36Quoted in Deutsch, The Genesis of Napoleonic 
Imperialism, 216. 
"Quoted in Epstein, The Genesis of German Conservatism, 
474 . 
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his realm. Soon, knightly property was again being brutally 
confiscated. Following a futile appeal to Napoleon himself, 
which was left unanswered, Gemmingen and his fellows queried 
Austria; Could nothing be done? 
Once more Austrian troops moved to the Inn and the 
pressure rapidly mounted. The Aulic Council issued a 
Konservatorium aimed directly at guilty Bavaria, demanding 
the restoration of all knights to their former places. To 
enforce the act, Francis appointed Arch-Chancellor Dalberg 
of Mainz, the elector of Saxony and the Duke of Baden as 
guardians of the rights of the Reichsritter. By doing so 
Francis hoped to legitimize the knight's position by backing 
it with the procedures of the Reich. The three leaders 
accepted the order and set to organizing a Regensburg 
commission to decide what to do.38 
The spring of 1804 found Max Joseph in a new quandary. 
Various counter-proposals from Austria complicated the 
situation; the machinations of Philip Stadion and the 
Archduke Charles confused Max Joseph, who remained was 
unsure of Austria's official position on the issue.39 
38Gagliardo, Reich and Nation, 230; Atkinson, A History 
of Germany, 468. Klaus Epstein believes the ambitious ruler 
of Wiirttemberg, Frederick, more guilty of assaults on the 
knights than Max Joseph, but Wiirttemberg did not suffer the 
threat of the konservatorium like Bavaria. See Epstein, The 
Genesis of German Conservatism, 217. 
39Rossler, Hellmuth, Graf Johann Philipp Stadion: 
Napoleons deutscher Gegenspieler, (Munich: Verlag Herold, 
1966) 180. Count Stadion's nefarious role in this stemmed 
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Napoleon, after the brief respite of the Peace of Amiens was 
once more engaged in conflict with Great Britain, had tired 
of the affair. The First Consul did not approve of the 
behavior of either country and certainly did not relish the 
thought of Austrian army corps assembling on the Inn. 
Napoleon encouraged Bavaria to back down. Max Joseph 
reluctantly relented and those knights which still desired 
to retain their position were allowed to return. Napoleon 
then admonished Francis February 14, 1804, warning Austria 
that "...however occupied France may be with the war she is 
now pursuing, she is keeping her eye upon the affairs of the 
Continent and on those of Germany, with which they are 
intimately connected."40 Napoleon's warning made only a 
fleeting impression upon the Austrian and Bavarian 
administrations. Austrian units remained on the Inn River. 
The Elector of Bavaria, likewise, slowly reneged on his 
promises of restoration. 
During this time, it dawned upon Montgelas and Napoleon 
that a true defensive alliance might be a possibility. 
from his ownership of property presently in Bavarian hands 
and his friendship with the Finance Minister, Hompesch. 
Stadion hoped to alter Austrian policy in his favor. 
Archduke Charles' more official role, ordering his emissary 
Fassbinder to approach Gravenreuth about the exchange of 
Bavarian possessions along the Inn (i.e. Passau) for 
Hapsburg possessions in Swabia, reveals that Austria, too, 
dealt with this issue for politically reasons and not just 
for the betterment of the Reich. 
40Napoleon to Francis, February 14, 1804, quoted in 
Deutsch, The Genesis of Napoleonic Imperialism, 219. 
Bavaria could thus be brought under French protection. An 
act of such magnitude would inevitably touch off a war, but 
it appeared that with the recalcitrant Max Joseph continuing 
to encroach upon the knight's lands and the continued 
presence of Austrian troops war was already becoming a real 
threat. At first, Napoleon contented himself by repeatedly 
calling for disarmament, but it was becoming clear that the 
issue required more active measures. Thus the Franco-
Bavarian alliance came into being not as part of a 
conscious, thought-out policy, but rather through reaction 
to the immediate situation. 
The benefits of such an agreement could be great for 
both parties. Montgelas could proceed with great vigor 
under a protective French umbrella; Luneville and the 
Reichsdeputation had shown him that. France also benefited; 
French troops, freely deployed in Bavarian domains, would be 
very close the Austrian capital, and the idea of a French-
supported confederation had been fermenting in the minds of 
Napoleon and Talleyrand. Though Max Joseph sent 
representatives to the meeting of the German princes in 
Mainz in September, 1804, and declined to appear personally, 
Napoleon did attend, and the concept of a confederation was 
quietly discussed.41 
41This was the first of Napoleon's "Grand Reviews" of 
which he would become so fond in later years. His passage 
would be marked by a brief period of intense government 
activity by the local regime to demonstrate their ability. 
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Two related events in 1804 exacerbated the situation. 
Napoleon's drive for total authority peaked after the 
Cadoudal plot of early 1804 and the kidnapping and execution 
of the Due d'Enghien. To solidify his position, Napoleon 
sought to elevate himself to the rank of emperor, which, 
again by personal fiat, occurred on on May 18, 1804. His 
extraordinary self-coronation took place on December 2 of 
the same year. Francis, rightly fearing for his own elected 
status as Oberhaupt, decided to declare himself hereditary 
Emperor of Austria. His was an unmitigated act of self-
preservation and pride, and it astounded the princes of the 
Empire. In response Max Joseph and Frederick of Wurttemberg 
declared themselves Kings. They, too, acted out of self-
interest; both sought European legitimacy. The difference 
was that while Austrian military power would uphold Francis' 
new title, it would require Bonaparte to authenticate the 
new Bavarian crown. 
Meanwhile, the bidding for Bavaria's hand continued. 
Angered by Max Joseph's impertinence, Francis convened the 
Aulic Council, which at his bidding produced an exzitorium 
on March 3, 1805, demanding compliance from Bavaria over the 
See Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 39. 
Talleyrand, among others, considered this trip a great 
success. He called in "une campagne d'or," perhaps because 
of the great number of bribes and gifts given him by the 
German princes, one of which amounted to £82,000. See C.M. 
Talleyrand-Perigord, Memoirs of C.M. Talleyrand de Perigord, 
(New York: The International Library Society, 1900) 11:254-
255 . 
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issue of the knights. Simultaneously French Marshal 
Guillaume Brune arrived in Munich as a special envoy of 
Emperor Napoleon to test the political atmosphere. He and 
Otto learned from Montgelas that the Bavarians desired an 
alliance only if it led to peace, for their fear of war was 
great. In return for the vague promise of a questionable 
force of 30,000 Bavarian soldiers, Max Joseph wanted 
subsidies and land compensation, namely Austrian Swabia and 
the mountainous Tyrol and Innvertiel to the south.42 
Montgelas desired the alliance, but he was unsure of Max 
Joseph; "I cannot hope to make a hero of a prince who has 
not the necessary disposition."43 He feverishly worked on 
the elector for a decision; Max Joseph only hesitated. 
His course decided, Napoleon leaned harder, giving his 
assurances that all would be well. He earnestly desired to 
support Max Joseph, and he was agreeable to the terms for 
alliance. Though perched on the cool shores of the English 
Channel and thirsting to invade the British isles, Napoleon 
42Gagliardo, Reich and Nation, 231; Deutsch, The Genesis 
of Napoleonic Imperialism, 332-334. 
43Quoted in Deutsch, The Genesis of Napoleonic 
Imperialism, 334. Two letters from Gravenreuth, the first 
on May 15,1805, and the second two days later, convinced 
Montgelas of the desperate nature of the situation. "In 
case this misfortune is unavoidable, I must again impress 
upon your Highness that the occupation of Bavaria will be on 
of the first developments."; "As a man of honor and 
devotion I cannot hide from my prince that he must of 
necessity take one side or the other of the warring powers 
if he does not with to sign the death warrant of his state." 
See also Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten, 98-100. 
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nonetheless exhibited the desire to go to Bavaria if 
necessary to assure Max Joseph that it was in France's best 
interests to support the needs of Bavaria. "Write...to 
Otto," the French Emperor instructed a busy Talleyrand, "so 
he can persuade them that I have the same intentions.1,44 To 
Cetto he announced: 
Assure his serene highness in the first letter you 
send to Munich, that in earnest of the interests and 
friendship which bind me to him I will do eveything 
that may be agreeable to him. I will defend his House 
everywhere, and on every occassion that presents itself 
I will secure it all possible advantage. 
Even with a decision imperative the Bavarian elector 
balked. With the French Emperor and his closest advisor 
encouraging haste, Max Joseph nevertheless moved 
ponderously, dragging on until June. On June 9, 1805, Otto, 
to whom much of the credit for French success in foreign 
affairs in 1804 and 1805 should go, finally recieved a 
tentative affirmation of the alliance. Max Joseph had 
decided to side with France despite his fear that they would 
end up fighting Austria, Russia, and even Prussia. The 
exact terms were not settled until the end of the month, and 
even then the elector wavered before the pressure of 
Austrian threats and counter-proposals. 
44Napoleon to Talleyrand, April 7, 1805, Correspondance 
de Napoleon Ier, Vol X, no, 8,536, (Paris: Henri Plon, 
1868) . 
45Napoleon to Cetto, May 28, 1805, quoted in Deutsch, 
The Genesis of Napoleonic Imperialism, 335. 
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Secretly signed by Otto and Montgelas (though not fully 
ratified) on July 31, 1805, the Franco-Bavarian alliance 
called for 20,000 Bavaria soldiers to supplement the Grande 
Armee when and if it would arrive. In return, the French 
would supply guidance and subsidies to reform the Bavarian 
military. Certain principalities would become Bavarian 
spoils should war with Austria materialize.46 An exasperated 
Napoleon declared repeatedly "j'approuve le traite 
d'alliance," and warned Otto, Talleyrand, and especially 
Cobenzl of Austria that if the Hapsburgs would not back 
down, "je serai moi-meme avec 200,000 hommes en Baviere."47 
He immediately sent General Henri Bertrand to Munich, 
ostensibly to help mobilize the Bavarian army to take part 
in Napoleon's rapidly developing plan of attack, though 
Bertrand's immediate duty was to scout out the terrain and 
make himself available to Montgelas and General von Triva.48 
The effect of the alliance on neighboring minor states was 
immediate. Following Bavaria's lead, an equally recalcitrant 
Wiirttemberg joined France. The rest of southern Germany 
soon followed. 
46Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten, 98-99; d'Arenberg, Lesser 
Princes, 98. 
47Napoleon to Talleyrand, August 16, 1805, 
Correspondances de Napoleon, no. 9,087. 
48Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten, 101-102; Deutsch, The 
Genesis of Napoleonic Imperialism, 345; Napoleon to 
Bertrand, August 25, 1805, Correspondances, no. 9,133. 
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All this had been carefully masked from Austria, but 
the War of the Third Coalition was, in Francis' mind, 
already a reality. The declaration of war would be a simple 
formality. Unaware of the recently signed Franco-Bavarian 
treaty, he took a foolish step. Austrian Counts 
Schwarzenberg and Buol-Schauenstein arrived in Munich the 
first week of September with an ominous ultimatum from 
Vienna. Bavaria must immediately return the property of the 
knights, allow Austrian troops under General Karl Mack von 
Leiberich to cross the Inn, and supplement his force with 
all available Bavarian troops. Francis "encouraged" Max 
Joseph by alluding to the ancient friendship of their 
houses.49 While Schwarzenberg was all bluster, Buol-
Schauenstein offered money, the city of Salzburg, and 
recognition of the royal crown to Max Joseph in return for 
an alliance. Neither offer was serious, for as they spoke 
Mack's white-coated Austrians were at that time crossing en 
masse the bridges of the Inn and clogging the roads toward 
Munich. In one swift move Austria had gone from aggrieved 
patron to criminal violator of the sacred German 
49Schwarzenberg, Karl Fiirst, Feldmarsahll Fiirst 
Schwarzenberg, Der Sieger von Leipzig, (Munich: Verlag 
Herold, 1964) 85, 466 fn 140. Francis threatened in an 
almost amiable tone; "Mon cher Prince, abouches-vous demain 
matin avec le minstre bon de Montgelas, il vous dira mes 
demandes, n'y soyer pas contraire, je compte sure votre 
ancienne amitie. Bon soir, mon cher ami, je vais me 
coucher, je n'ai fait que vomir toute la soiree et j'ai la 
fievre." See also Montgelas, Denwiirdigkeiten, 103-104. 
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constitution. By invading, Francis became the aggressor. 
Napoleon, as he wished, could declare Francis in violation 
of his own law, and he could conduct the war on the pretense 
of defending German liberty. 
In a moment of sheer panic, Max Joseph and his wife 
fled north-west to Wiirzburg with Montgelas, Hompesch, and 
others in tow. The various divisions of his army trailed 
behind. Buol-Schauenstein followed, continuing to ask for 
an Austro-Bavarian agreement. At this point even Otto began 
to despair; "We have against us the timidity of the prince, 
the nobility, and the court, and particularly the tears of 
Madame the Electrice. "50 Talleyrand, however, radiated 
confidence. All that was needed was time, he replied to 
Otto. He ordered the harried French ambassador to instruct 
Max Joseph to "feign coldness" and keep the Austrians 
guessing. Napoleon was in the field and the Grande Armee 
was rushing south-east from the Cherbourg coast. "At least 
this procedure will incline Austria to circumspection. The 
tardiness of her measures may gain a few days and that is 
all that is necessary."51 
50Quoted in Deutsch, The Genesis of Napoleonic 
Imperialism, 354. Though he liked Montgelas, Otto had no 
great love for the elector, whom he saw for what he was. "I 
await with the greatest impatience the arrival of our 
troops. I have to do with the most feeble, the most timid, 
the most inconstant prince of Europe. My position at London 
was less delicate and less disagreeable than that in which 
circumstances have place me in the last fifteen days." 
51Quoted in Ibid., 349. 
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Though seldom brilliant in the conduct of foreign 
affairs, Montgelas rose to the occasion. Even as Austrian 
troops entered and plundered Munich, as Napoleon's seven 
army corps sped across France in a race for the Rhine, as a 
sickly Max Joseph oscillated between Austria and France, 
hoping for succour from French troops, Montgelas hit upon a 
superb plan. Crown Prince Ludwig had just finished a 
journey through France and currently resided at Lausanne in 
French-held Switzerland. With this in mind, Montgelas 
instructed Max Joseph to send a false letter to Francis 
stating that if Bavaria joined the Austrians, Napoleon 
threatened to imprison and maybe execute the elector's son 
and heir. To complete the plan, Montgelas chose as his 
emissary the Governor of Munich, Count Nogarola, who was 
completely unaware of the French treaty and believed that 
Bavaria would soon make common cause with Austria. He would 
remain on call in Vienna to convey subsequent messages to 
Francis .52 
The delay worked. Marshal Bernadotte's French troops 
arrived in Wiirzburg on September 26, 1805. The arrival of 
the blue-coated Frenchmen forced Max Joseph to ratify the 
Franco-Bavarian alliance. In due course, a surprised 
Nogarola was informed of the event and he in turn informed 
Francis. At first the Austrian Emperor simply did not 
52Ibid. , 350-351; Montgelas, Denwiirdigkeiten, 104-10; 
d'Arenberg, Lesser Princes, 101. 
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believe him. "Either they have permitted themselves a bad 
joke with you," Francis told Nogarola, "or it is you who 
wishes to do this to me."53 When Nogarola finally convinced 
him that the Franco-Bavarian alliance was reality, Francis 
flew into a rage. "Je ne veux pas prendre la Baviere, je 
veux la manger!"54 The die had been cast, however, and 
elements of the Grande Armee swarmed into Bavaria. In a 
lightning campaign, Napoleon surrounded and captured Mack 
and most of his army at Ulm. The remaining Austrian forces 
fell back behind the Inn to attempt to link up with a 
Russian army under Marshal Kutuzov approaching from the 
east. Bavaria had been saved once more. 
Napoleon loudly proclaimed his arrival in Bavaria. He 
encouraged the Bavarian army; "You are fighting for the 
first goods of the nation, for independence and political 
existence!"55 To the apprehensive elector he declared that he 
would soon be arriving in Munich, pleasantly requested Max 
Joseph to meet him there, and assured him that France would 
continue to protect him as it had just done.56 The point was 
clear. France had solved Bavarian foreign policy with 
military force and diplomatic action; these events would 
53Ibid. , 352. 
54d'Arenberg, Lesser Princes, 102. 
55Quoted in Trietschke, History of Germany, vol I, 257. 
56Napoleon to Max Joseph, October 23, 1805, 
Correspondances, no. 9,418. 
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have an indelible impact on the internal reorganization of 
Bavaria. As French power supplanted that of the of the 
Reich Montgelas' possibilities of reform expanded radically. 
Ill 
Bavarian Internal Reforms, 1799-1806 
Stuart Woolf remarks that of all the Napoleonic 
satellites, only Bavaria and the principality of Neuchatel 
had been free from recent political disruption at the dawn 
of the Empire.57 Certainly this changed with the advent of 
the Montgelas period. While externally Bavaria continued to 
suffer from her second-rate position in European affairs, 
internally the engine of bureaucracy was sputtering to life. 
During Max Joseph's first tumultuous six years, 
Montgelas secured his position by frequently reorganizing 
his weapon for reform, the executive ministries. Montgelas' 
goal, the creation of functional, streamlined bureaucratic 
structures, would require smoothly functioning bureaus, 
resembling those of Prussia. The February 25, 1799 decree, 
creating the four executive ministries of the 
Staatsconferenz, relieved existing government bureaus of all 
57Wolff, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 85. 
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duties without exception.58 The ministries assumed full 
control of all government functions. Though other boards 
and assemblies would be created during the first year, the 
official boundaries of the ministries were not set until May 
26, 1801. Therefore, for the first two years, the 
ministers, with Montgelas directing, took whatever actions 
were necessary to encourage reform. Implied in the 
reorganization of the Staatsconferenz was that at any time, 
due to the deaths of ministers Hompesch senior, Baron von 
Hertling, Hompesch junior, and then Morawitzky, jurisdiction 
over the affairs of their ministries would invariably go to 
Montgelas. Indeed, after 1806 he had control of 
ecclesiastical affairs and justice as well as foreign 
affairs.59 Though the others undoubtedly contributed to the 
reforms, it is clear to whom the majority of credit or blame 
should go. 
Legislation in the democratic sense did not take place 
in Max Joseph's Bavaria. Electoral edicts were ratified by 
a rather informal body known as the Geheimerat, or Conseil 
d'Etat. This body consisted of three ministers, as often as 
not the executive ministers of the Staatsconferenz, and 
their respective groups of consultant advisors. It was 
58Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 15. 
590n the complicated reform of the ministries see 
Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 15-17 and Dunan, Napoleon et 
1'Allemagne, 77-79. 
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their task to edit the wording of the electoral edicts, but 
they could not issue laws without the consent of the 
elector. The body met regularly but was without written 
guidelines, so its performance is difficult to assess. For 
the most part, it simply seconded the ideas of the 
Staatsconferenz. The dissolution of the Geheimerat in 1806 
to await further reconstruction illustrates its general lack 
of vitality.60 
Juridic power remained a persistent problem for 
Montgelas. Judicial authority rested with two bodies and 
was intensely associated with administrative duties. The 
first, the Generallandesdirektion under President Joseph 
August von Torring-Gronsfeld (1753-1826), was created by the 
decrees of April 23 and October 5, 1799. Von Torring led 
two vice-presidents and 42 councillors. This administrative 
body combined a very simple court system, a police 
authority, and executive power, subdivided into seven 
separate sections.61 A second, smaller 
Generallandesdirektion guided affairs in the Palatinate 
until its absorption by France. The second organization, 
the landrichte, embodied the administrative bureaucracy 
60Dunan, Napoleon et 1'Allemagne, 78. 
61
 Ibid. , 79. The seven deputations were police (for the 
entire domain), mines and coinage (under Mathias Flurl), 
fiefs (under Adam von Aretin, Christopher's capable 
brother), forests and housing, military administration 
(seconded to the ministry of war later), commerce and 
customs, and compatability of laws. 
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Montgelas so desired to establish. The landrichte came into 
being after the abolishment of all previous offices and 
bureaus on March 24, 1802. In their place the new bureaus 
of the landrichte would have first jurisdiction over all 
civil cases and in some instances criminal proceedings. All 
police functions moved from the Generallandesdirektion to 
the landrichte, including criminal "instruction" and 
gathering court fines. 
Awkward as it was, the judicial system remained in 
place during the early years, but was one of Montgelas' 
least successful changes. The bureaucracy tied directly to 
the judicial power, on the other hand, became a great 
success. Montgelas' dreams of forwarding the administration 
on the shoulders of competent, qualified men functioned both 
through the landrichte and the generallandesdirektion. The 
multifarious bureaus of the 18th-century disappeared and 
were replaced by a slowly accelerating modern system. The 
dienstpragmatik, the edict of January 1, 1805, solidly 
reinforced the bureaucracy by suppressing all sales of 
offices or titles and set the requirements and prerequisite 
qualifications for civil service.62 Montgelas listed the 
qualifying terms of employment as "...ceux de sa famille, 
62Ramm, Germany, 78. 
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ses annees de service, ses qualites morales et 
intellectuelles. "63 
With the help of the newly-created bureaus, the 
ministers of the state set to work in changing the 
religious, military, and economic conditions of the state. 
While the military remained in relatively poor shape until 
after 1805 and the economy would not be greatly affected 
during the first five years, Bavarian Catholics endured the 
trauma of a long-delayed "reformation." The assault on the 
Catholic preeminence in Bavaria roughly parallels the 
foreign affairs of the state. Lands annexed by Bavaria as 
part of the Reichsdeputation and by the terms of Austria's 
surrender in 1805 contained many Protestants; Montgelas had 
to initiate reforms of some kind to integrate the new 
subjects. But unlike the long path to the Franco-Bavarian 
alliance, Montgelas' policy was planned before the arrival 
of Napoleonic troops. 
Reducing Catholic power in Bavaria was not an entirely 
new idea. Both Max Joseph III and Karl Theodor attempted 
minor reforms. The Roman Catholic Church had been somewhat 
restrained by the Ems Punktation of 1786, which terminated 
the power of future papal bulls and eliminated appeals to 
the Holy See.64 Montgelas' was a vastly accelerated policy. 
63Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 53 (quote)-55 . 
64Fisher, Studies in Napoleonic Statesmenship, 10-11. 
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The period of 1799 to 1805 saw distinct, major advances on 
behalf of the Protestants and prophetic assurances for the 
improvement of Jewish rights. Just as in government reform, 
these years produced incredible changes which would be 
codified into law during the Empire period. Unlike the 
trial-and-error reform of the administration, nearly all the 
changes in favor of the Protestants and the secularization 
of church possessions would be complete before 1805. 
The battle was not as difficult as one might imagine. 
Although the innate conservatism of the small, rural town 
and the agricultural poor bred unyielding attitudes toward 
Protestants and Jews, resistance was disorganized and 
without able leadership. When faced with a determined 
administration, the relative strength of the Catholics was a 
mere facade, encouraged by wealthy bishops and fostered 
daily by the efforts of monks and nuns, hidden behind feast-
days, holy days, and the maintenance of church-sanctioned 
superstitions. As Montgelas publicly declared; 
One of the most powerful obstacles is to be found 
in the present condition of the Bavarian monasteries, 
and more especially of the mendicant monks. They 
recognize themselves that the new spirit of the age has 
led to a change in public attitude toward them; but 
this has only led them to redouble their efforts to 
work for their own preservation. They have encouraged 
the perpetuation of superstition and of the most 
baneful errors; they have built up obstacles against 
the spread of enlightened principles; and they have 
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sown suspicion against every institution working for 
true moral education.65 
Montgelas sought to end the superstitions encouraged by 
Catholic traditions. Such myths included the ringing of 
church bells before thunderstorms, which caused riots, the 
firing of muskets into the air before storms or in times of 
celebration, which caused injuries, and the unsound 
abhorrence of breast-feeding among Catholic mothers, which 
caused higher infant mortality rates. Peasant pilgrimages 
to sacred shrines were cause for riots and revelry, 
disrupting trade and commerce, not to mention that citizens 
were frittering away constructive working hours in useless 
activities.66 Protestant work ethics, which many of the new 
ministers held, demanded more of the people, and the 
philosophes of the Enlightenment encouraged the abolition of 
medieval practices in a modern state. 
Opposition to the changes lay rooted in the gentry and 
the bishops. With their lands rapidly dwindling or being 
appropriated wholesale by the new government, the failing 
aristocracy saw the destruction of traditional Catholic 
power as one more attack upon themselves. On May 31, 1800, 
Baron von Kern, as spokesman for the nobles, addressed the 
assembly of the landschaftverordnete. A bitter foe of 
65Quoted in Epstein, The Genesis of German Conservatism, 
601. 
66Higby, Religious Policy, 84-91; Sheehan, German 
History, 76.. 
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Montgelas whom he considered a foreigner, Kern announced 
that the dissolution of church lands constituted the gravest 
threat to the state. 
Our old constitution is to be replaced by an 
arbitrary despotism, a system which destroys but cannot 
construct, a system which is not represented by native 
officials but by birds of passage and parvenu 
unpropertied spinners of projects. Our immediate 
objective must be the confirmation by the prince of the 
old standische liberties as part of the traditional 
ceremony of homage. This is not a matter of going 
back to old forms--under which, incidentally, prince, 
stande, and subjects were far happier, united and 
prosperous than they are likely to be under any new 
dispensation--but rather a matter of maintaining an 
existing constitution of acknowledged excellence.67 
Kern's plea went unheard. No champion of the 
aristocracy had the power to step forward, and the Reich was 
impotent. The bishops, who naturally fought Max Joseph's 
policies, were also easily bypassed. The elector simply 
waited for the deaths of these elderly officials and then 
did not allow Rome to replace them, effectively beheading 
the Catholic leadership in Bavaria. 
Bavarian religious policy of the electoral years 
contains three major themes. The first two--secularization 
of church lands, such as monasteries and abbeys, and the 
removal of Catholic authority--go hand in hand. Prior to 
1802, only the threat of religous reform existed, but as the 
need to reorganize the backward school system increased so 
did the peril to the mendicant orders who, for the most 
67Quoted in Epstein, The Genesis of German Conservatism, 
613-614 . 
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part, controlled their day to day operation. By unpublished 
edict, January 25, 1802, Max Joseph authorized the third 
part of the reform program, the suppression of all mendicant 
orders.68 Montgelas, Morawitzky, and Zentner went to work 
directly. All ecclesiastical power over education 
disappeared, to be replaced by a state system of schools 
which, like the administration, would undergo frequent 
changes. The Augustinians, Dominicans, Capuchins, 
Franciscans, and others lost all rights to land and 
edifices. Most buildings were abruptly torn down to pave 
the way for schools and, rarely, new Protestant churches. 
The land was sold or redistributed in a manner reminiscent 
of England's Henrician Reformation. Money from these sales 
went either directly to state coffers or education funds. 
Nuns, friars, and monks were pensioned off. Some were 
allowed regular salaries if they went to work for Catholic 
priests. In this instance, Bavarian action presented 
Napoleon with a fait accompli; it was not until the end of 
the Reichsdeputation in February of the following year that 
Napoleon sanctioned such policy.69 
Unfortunately, this disruptive event did not occur 
peacefully or without waste. Treatment of the displaced 
monks was at times barbaric. Popular protest at their 
68Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 127. 
69Ibid. , 127-128; Higby, Religious Policy, 178. 
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removal was feared, by the government, so frequently the 
mendicants were rushed out by Bavarian soldiers in the 
middle of the night. The nuns of the abbey at Anger were 
moved during a violent thunderstorm. Some had to endure 
snow and bitter cold. In addition, vast libraries protected 
for centuries by the thorough mendicants were seized and 
Zentner, for one, allowed some of them to be sold to Munich 
to be turned into pasteboard.™ Though pensions were 
promised and the monks were encouraged to work with the 
local priests as assistants, many turned full-time to 
begging. This practice became so prevalent that Max Joseph 
issued an edict against it, March 13, 1802. Five days 
later, to fulfil his promised obligations, the elector 
established a Commission of Secularization which outlined 
the basis for pensions and salaries, a general pension 
becoming law June 12, 1804.71 
In combination with the secularization of church 
property, Montgelas and Morawitzky employed other methods. 
An order issued April 17, 1802 systematized the demolition 
of old Catholic churches in parishes needing new local 
schools. Bishopric power was greatly trimmed in 1803 by a 
series of government decisions, limiting clerical influence 
70Higby, Religious Policy, 187-188, 196-197. 
Christopher von Aretin led a commision to save the books and 
many were removed to the staatsbibliothek in Munich. 
71Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 122-123. 
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in government affairs. Max Joseph's March 7, 1804 edict 
declared that the church could no longer exist as a 
standestaat, a state within a state, and that the Bavarian 
administration could interfere in any and all religious 
matters whenever it were deemed necessary. Religious 
interference in secular and state affairs was 
correspondingly forbidden.72 There would be additional 
changes in later years which further stripped the Catholics 
of power. However, during the electoral years Montgelas 
employed a third method, one which limited Catholic power 
indirectly and helped achieve a greater parity of 
denominations in the state. 
The third characteristic of Bavarian religious reform 
was the integration of the Protestants and to a much lesser 
extent, the Jews. Together with the new bureaucracy this 
was the cornerstone of Montgelas' reform program. An 
anonymous memorandum at the palace dated April 10, 1799 
reads "the need for religious toleration is necessary to 
attract useful foreigners for industry and enlightenment." 
The statement is attributed to the Savoyard minister.73 
Montgelas' liberalism was thus not wholely altruistic. 
Toleration was both necessary and beneficial. He believed 
that Protestants offered much for his country and, thus, for 
72Higby, Religious Policy, 211. 
73Vedeler, "The Genesis of Toleration...", 484. 
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his lordship the elector. In industry, commerce, education, 
and morality, their inclusion as full citizens could only 
enrich Bavarian economy and society. A few local leaders 
preceded even Montgelas. Some rulers in recently annexed 
lands already issued laws of toleration in favor of the 
evangelical faith within their principalities. For example, 
Baron von Lindenfels of Ketzersdorf allowed all Protestants 
full rights of law.74 Displaying his usual agressiveness, 
Max Joseph created a private Protestant chapel in the court 
for his dear Electress, Caroline of Baden in 1799. The 
first public announcement followed on April 8, 1800, when it 
was announced that all Protestants in Munich could begin to 
freely worship without the fear of Catholic reprisal.75 Due 
to the relatively small number of Protestants in the 
capital, this edict was mainly symbolic, but soon the 
government's intentions became clear. Even before the 
ratification of the Reichsdeputation, edict after edict 
opened windows of opportunity for aspiring Protestants. In 
August of the same year settlement in Bavaria was offered to 
all non-Catholics, excepting Jews. Montgelas stated... 
Upon various occassions we have learned that many 
cherish the erroneous opinion that the qualification of 
the Catholic religion is a necessary condition to 
settling in Bavaria. This has been down to the present 
time of the greatest disadvantage to the encouragement 
74Ibid. , 486. 
75Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 122. 
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of industry and agriculture in this country.76 
A second decree, issued in November, 1800, declared 
Protestant ministers henceforth free to hold services and 
give educational instruction anywhere in the state, though 
at this point it was still required to be done in private. 
Full rights were extended by the extraordinary Edict of 
Religious Freedom, January 10, 1803, which extended the 
right for all Bavarians to freely worship as they wished 
(excepting the Jews). Children could now be educated in the 
home and at church by Protestant ministers. Marriages 
between faiths were allowed in May, 1803 .77 These edicts 
helped successfully integrate new citizens. All subjects 
finally enjoyed religious freedom on par with much of 
Germany. 
As Montgelas hoped, the impact on the economy was quick 
to appear. Large numbers of industrialists sought 
opportunities in Bavaria's expanding market. Often local 
opposition forced the government enforce toleration. One 
Protestant entrepreneur, John Hochgesangt, desired to extend 
his prosperous pottery firm to Amberg in Haut-Palatinate. 
Demand for excellent Hochgesangt pottery was high in 
Germany, and the addition of his ceramic factories would 
76Quoted in Vedeler, "The Genesis of Toleration...," 
487 . 
"Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 123; Vedeler, "The Genesis 
of Toleration...", 480; Higby, Religious Policy, 121-122. 
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greatly boost Bavarian commerce. His purchase of factory 
sites in Amberg was, however, blocked by a recalcitrant 
Catholic magistrate. Montgelas' religious bureaus paved the 
way for Hochgesangt to set up his kilns despite the local 
resistance. To their credit his factories did quite well.78 
The cause of Jewish emancipation did not fare as well 
as toleration of Protestants. Despite the enlightened 
attitude of Montgelas' administration, the six years of the 
electorate saw little progress on behalf of Jews. Though 
Montgelas refers to them as somber, amiable, and content 
with small profits from their businesses, he nonetheless 
dedicated only three brief pages (out of twenty-six 
concerning toleration) in his account of Bavarian internal 
affairs.79 The deciding factor in all Jewish cases was often 
whether or not the Jews in question would add value to the 
Bavarian economy. The situation of the widowed Jewess Sara 
Schleierin, who wanted to give her son half her house so he 
would be able to marry, epitomizes Bavarian attitudes. The 
district magistrate, Baron von Lichtenstern, would not allow 
her to do so, declaring all Jews to be emissaries of fraud, 
bankruptcy, usury, and the trade of stolen goods.80 The fact 
that the government did not intercede on Scheierin's behalf 
78Vedeler, "The Genesis of Toleration...", 486. 
79Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 138-140. 
80Vedeler, "The Genesis of Toleration..." 488. 
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as they did on behalf of John Hochgesangt and other 
Protestant industrialists reveals the actual vein of early 
toleration. Scheierin did not offer any benefit to the 
economy and was summarily written off. The mixed marriages 
act of 1803 showed that Bavarians were ready for Protestant 
involvement in social as well as economic affairs, but Jews 
were not yet welcome. 
There was a glimmer of hope January 20, 1804, when, 
perhaps urged by more lenient elements in the administration 
led by Aretin, the government granted Jews admittance to 
both higher and lower schools administered by the state. 
Jewish freedom, however, would not come until the period of 
the Confederation. Furthermore, the reality of the laws, 
however superficially benevolent, was always by reason 
subject to and limited by the ingrained German prejudices 
against Jews. 
Religious toleration characterizes the most ambitious 
aspect of reform during the electoral period. Other 
successes included the creation of the new administration, 
and the modern bureaus laid the groundwork for the 
codification of the royal period. Land reform was pushed 
forward to some degree, but not nearly as it would be during 
the early years as a kingdom. Economics was affected by the 
immigration of sizable numbers of Protestant investors and 
businessmen, and commerce was streamlined by the removal of 
the irregular and frequent boundaries of the pfleger and 
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rentamer. On the whole, however, Max Joseph had not been in 
control long enough yet to make a significant impact on the 
economy of the state. 
Most of these measures illustrate solely the success of 
Montgelas and his administrators in pursuing their goal of a 
modern bureaucratic state. Napoleon's impact was restricted 
to the inclusion of new lands, which entailed greater leeway 
in land distribution and consolidation and a greater 
necessity for toleration to appease and seduce increasing 
numbers of Protestants to the area. The 1805 alliance 
announced a new era and a transformation of Franco-Bavarian 
interaction. 
Chapter 3 
Anchor of the Mittelstaat: 
Bavaria as part of the Rhine Confederation 
"Bavaria is engaged in a total revolution, though 
bloodless. The past is demolished and a new order of 
things founded." 
--Anselm von Feuerbach, 18081 
The years 1805 to 1812 marked the zenith of the 
Napoleonic Empire. These same years would see the further 
evolution of the Bavarian state. Max Joseph and Montgelas 
would legitimize the kingdom's existence with a 
constitution, solidify its borders by reorganization, and 
preserve its independence with a new, modern army based on 
the French model. French involvement in the process would 
be limited. Bavaria owed its inclusion as the premier state 
of Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine not so much to the 
astute diplomacy of her leaders as to continental forces 
beyond her control. However, the diligent work of Montgelas 
during the period of the French empire would help to ensure 
that when Napoleon's military success ended, Bavaria would 
not slip back into the political morass from whence she had 
struggled. This period is therefore characterized by the 
usually indirect influence of France on Bavarian affairs and 
the codification of the modernization reforms by Montgelas' 
administration. 
Quoted in Klang, "Bavaria and the War of Liberation," 
39 . 
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I 
Bavaria and the Napoleonic Empire 
The shattering defeat of the Austro-Russian allied army 
at Austerlitz, December 2, 1805, did not officially end the 
War of the Third Coalition, but it did conclude Austrian 
participation. Twice humiliated during the brief war and 
defeated by France for the third time since the outbreak of 
the French Revolution, Austria isolated herself to 
reorganize. Four years would pass before the Stadion's 
belligerent War Party would send Austria down the path of 
war once more. During that time, the Hapsburgs, impotent 
against France, dealt very little with Bavaria, much less 
interfere in her affairs. Thus, one of the major powers 
which dominated Max Joseph's foreign policy could not, for a 
time, upset progress in Munich. 
The other major power, of course, was France. 
Strangely enough Napoleon's direct impact on Bavaria, 
finally safely under his wing, would last no more than a 
year. Before the Franco-Bavarian alliance Bavaria 
frequently had to follow the French lead; after 1806, she 
would be more free to do as she needed and would not as 
often require the assistance of the French Emperor. 
Indirectly, however, French policy would continue to affect 
Bavaria. Once again many of the reforms Montgelas initiated 
would owe their completion in part to actions taken by 
Napoleon before the creation of the Confederation. 
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Additionally, many of the changes Bavaria would experience 
owed their existence to Imperial policy. The economy, for 
one, benefited from the strengthening of the Continental 
System. 
In 1806, however, the Corsican general had other 
affairs to conclude, and the resolution of the idea for a 
confederation was one of these. Austrian reparations had to 
be agreed upon first. The price of this third defeat, 
already costly in manpower and prestige, would be high. 
Against Talleyrand's advice Napoleon decided to punish the 
Hapsburgs harshly. For the most part, mediatization and 
compensation in the German minor states had heretofore been 
at the expense of the ecclesiastical states and free 
Imperial cities. Austria would join the list of the 
bereaved. The Treaty of Pressburg, signed December 27, 
1805, cost Francis Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, Venetia, and minor 
parts of Illyria. He renounced the allegiance of any 
principalities or cities in the Franconian, Swabian, and 
Bavarian circles. Tyrol and the Vorarlberg went to Max 
Joseph, who had to give up Wiirzburg to Austria in the 
interests of consolidating borders. In all, Austria lost 
2.5 million subjects, one-sixth of their annual revenue, and 
was forced to pay 40 million francs in reparations.2 On the 
2Talleyrand argued forcefully against punishing Austria 
further. He believed further humiliation would either break 
the country up in to civil war or galvanize anti-French 
forces in Vienna (which it did). "The Austrian monarcy is 
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day of the treaty Napoleon sent word to Max Joseph, 
congratulating him on his new acquisitions and reminding him 
of his (Napoleon's) loyalty to the Wittelsbach fortunes.3 
For their part, the Bavarians rejoiced at the news, but 
not only because of the new acquisitions. Upon Napoleon's 
return to Munich he decided to further solidify the Franco-
Bavarian alliance through traditional means, a marriage. 
Since 1804 Napoleon had hinted through Otto at the idea of 
betrothing the young Augusta, daughter of Max Joseph and 
Caroline, to his beloved and loyal stepson, Eugene de 
Beauharnais, now the Viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy. 
Indeed, while the French conqueror was in Munich Max Joseph 
secretly escorted Augusta to Napoleon's quarters for his 
approval. Napoleon, in his own words, was "embarassed" but 
composed of various states which differ among themselves in 
language, traditions, religion, and composition. They have 
a single thing in common; one and the same sovereign. The 
power of the monarchy is therefore weak, yet is is 
sufficient and a necessary obstacle to the barbarians. 
Austria is now defeated and humiliated. Its conqueror must 
now extend a generous hand and, by making it an ally, restor 
to it that confidence in itself of which it may be deprived 
by this series of defeats and disasters... It is now in the 
power of your majesty to destroy the Austrian monarchy or to 
raise it up. If you choose to destroy it, it will no longer 
be in your power to make the pieces whole again, and the 
existence of this monarchy is necessary, indispensible, to 
the future security of civilization." Quoted in Jack 
Bernard, Talleyrand: A Biography, New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1973, 262-264. 
3Napoleon to Max Joseph, Correspondances, no 9,620, 
December 27, 1805. 
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agreeable.4 The Wittelsbach elector was uncertain of this 
course, arguing that Eugene was only a step-son and not a 
son by birth, but in the end he relented, much to the 
delight of Napoleon and Josephine. The marriage was a very 
successful one and in time Eugene and Max Joseph became 
close friends, even after the fall of Napoleon. 
A second event superseded excitement over the impending 
marriage. On December 12, 1805, by French and Bavarian 
declaration, the Kingdom of Bavaria was created and 
Maximilian Joseph I became its first King. Frederick of 
Wiirttemberg followed suit in a few days; Karl August of 
Baden became a Grand Duke. All were for the time being to 
remain part of the Holy Roman Empire. Austria was too 
shattered to resist. Indeed, one of the terms of Pressburg 
was that he had to recognize the new royal titles. Prussia, 
desperately seeking a peaceful method to deal with French 
aggression, declined to object. A great step in the quest 
for legitimacy had been taken. Though Max Joseph's powers 
overtly would not change, the dignity of the title did much 
to embellish Bavarian prestige. The new monarch celebrated 
the restoration of Bavaria's ancient royal dignity by asking 
all Bavarians to wear blue and white cockades, borrowing 
4Gourgaud, Talks of Napoleon on St. Helena, 150-151. 
See also Napoleon to Max Joseph, Correspondances, no. 9,599, 
Decmeber 21, 1805. 
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from French popular symbolism.5 Logically, the next step 
would be the Confederation. 
As the new year began, this idea dominated affairs in 
Germany, and Prussia began to become concerned. Prussian 
leaders, astutely aware that Napoleon's weight could very 
well shift their way, scrambled for solutions. A Prussian 
plan for a loose federation centered on the houses of 
Hapsburg, Wittelsbach, and Hohenzollern was debated, but 
Bavaria was never formally notified of its existence. 
Prussia thus assumed condescending airs toward Munich. 
Frederick Wilhelm III had not argued against Max Joseph's 
coronation, but neither did he allow Bavaria equal 
consideration as a full-fledged monarchy. This attitude 
would help stale relations between the two and help ruin 
Prussia's negotiating position. 
Meanwhile, other Germans proposed different, 
conflicting ideas. Karl Dalberg, the Arch-Chancellor of the 
German Empire in Mainz, had wheedled and cajoled his way 
into a profitable position as Napoleon's most ardent German 
supporter. Though he clamored for Napoleon to accept the 
Holy Roman crown in the early months of 1806, he soon 
abandoned this in favor of a confederation. At Dalberg's 
insistence many of the minor princes appealed to Napoleon to 
protect them as he had Bavaria in 1805. Some of them needed 
5Trietschke, History of Germany, 263. 
93 
protection even from Bavaria and her neighbors. In 
particular, King Frederick of Wiirttemberg's continued 
encroachment on neighboring lands caused bickering among the 
minor states. His actions led Napoleon to believe that some 
of these states, angered by Frederick's naked aggression, 
may well declare in favor of Austria against France's German 
allies should some vote come up in the Imperial Diet. A 
solution was essential. The German reformers continued to 
produce various partisan ideas. Through May and June of 
18 06 different plans were submitted by Minister Reitzenstein 
of Wiirttemberg for the further mediatization of the few 
remaining minor principalities in southern Germany. Envoys 
from Bavaria and Baden perused these plans and rejected 
them, submitting their own designs. The southern German 
states could not agree on how to complete the rounding out 
of their borders.6 It was clear France would have to 
resolve the issue herself. 
On May 22, 1806, Talleyrand, always a proponent of a 
confederation, presented Napoleon with a memorandum, 
querying the Emperor for a decision. Talleyrand asked three 
questions: should the princes be allied to one another, 
guaranteeing each other's rights and privileges; would there 
be a mandatory troop allotment for the defence of any 
confederation and if so, how many soldiers would be required 
6Sheehan, German History, 248; d'Arenberg, Lesser 
Princes, 119-130. 
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of each country; and should certain minor territories such 
as Baden, Hesse-Cassel, or Nassau be absorbed into a larger 
polity or left as sovereign states?7 Napoleon responded 
swiftly. On June 11, ambassador Cetto was informed of a 
tentative plan for confederation. Bavaria, like the other 
states, would declare full sovereignty, separate from the 
Holy Roman Empire. All would band together in a 
confederation allied with France. Three vague councils 
would decide the needs of the confederation. The most 
important council, headed by Dalberg, would be "the Council 
of Kings," of which Bavaria would be the most important 
member. Napoleon would be the "Protector" of the 
confederation and Dalberg would be the "Prince-Primate." In 
the first draft both were accorded many powers, so many that 
Cetto, on behalf of Max Joseph, refused to sign.8 
A lively exchange ensued. Napoleon needed Bavarian 
support. His insistance upon Bavaria's ratification 
illuminates Bavaria's standing among the German minor 
states. If Max Joseph would agree to the confederation, the 
others would sign, just as they had done with the alliance 
treaties in 1805. Napoleon therefore ordered Talleyrand to 
step up the pressure and get the signatures one way or 
another. Talleyrand allowed Cetto to be the only ambassador 
7d'Arenberg, Lesser Princes, 130. 
&Ibid., 134. 
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from any of the German states to see the rough draft. After 
studying the document, Cetto announced that leaving the Holy 
Roman Empire was agreeable to Bavaria but that Dalberg 
seemed to have too much power. The Fundamental Statutes, 
which would be drawn up by Dalberg to govern the meetings of 
the confederation, should be completed by Dalberg and then 
examined by Bavaria before the treaty could be ratified. 
Talleyrand, following his master's orders, pressed Cetto to 
sign. Where diplomacy failed, duplicity succeeded. 
Emulating the style employed by Montgelas against Francis in 
18 05, the French refused to allow Cetto to speak with anyone 
and Gravenreuth, who was shuttling Cetto's messages to and 
from Bavaria, was told that the treaty was signed. By the 
time Gravenreuth discovered otherwise and hastened back to 
Paris with orders to delay, Cetto had given in.9 As 
Napoleon suspected, the other German states, none of which 
disliked the idea in theory but none of which were truly 
ready for a French-sponsored confederation, reluctantly 
followed Bavaria's lead. 
July 12, 1806, Napoleon dissolved the Holy Roman Empire 
and with sixteen German princes formed the Confederation of 
the Rhine. Karl Dalberg became the Duke of Frankfort and 
the Prince-Primate (article I & II), Napoleon was named the 
9Enno E. Kraehe, Metternich's German Policy: Volume I: 
The Contest with Napoleon, 1799-1814, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1963) 48. 
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"Protector" of the Confederation (article XII), and the many 
territorial squabbles came to an end. All present borders 
were to be maintained (article VI), and future changes would 
be dealt with by the three councils under Dalberg's 
leadership (articles XIII to XV). The royal titles given to 
Bavaria and Wiirttemberg would remain (article V) . The 
greatest responsibility would be the military commitment, 
which hinged on Article XXXV; war declared on France would 
be war upon them all. Bavaria's contribution to the 
100,000-plus army was the largest, 30,000, though it will be 
seen their contribution greatly surpassed that number.10 
Francis, left with no recourse, abdicated August 1, 1806. 
The Holy Roman Empire was no more. 
It's replacment, the Confederation of the Rhine, was at 
heart an extension of Napoleon's war-making capacity, both a 
military buffer against Prussia and Austria and a willing 
ally in the blockade against Britain. The involvement of 
its members states, like the French satellites of Holland, 
Westphalia, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and the Kingdom of 
Italy, entailed much more than simple military obligations. 
Through his new nobility and bureaucracy, Napoleon was 
attempting to spread the ideas of the French Revolution to 
all the countries under his influence. Ideas such as 
10Bourienne, Louis Antoine Fauvelet de, Memoirs of 
Napoleon Bonaparte (ed. by R.W. Phipps), (New York: Merrill 
and Baker, 1885); Sheehan, German History, 248-249; 
d'Arenberg, Lesser Princes, 144-146; Ramm, Germany, 61-62. 
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progress, equality, and "civilization" were injected into 
the governments of French-allied states. As Stuart Woolf 
notes, how to integrate such ideas into a political body was 
the central political problem of the Napoleonic Empire.11 
Because of her importance as Napoleon's largest sovereign 
ally, Bavaria enjoyed a degree of freedom from this 
integration; freedom, however, had its costs. Bavaria's 
reward for becoming the premier ally of the French Empire 
would be extensions of French "civilization": mandatory 
participation in the Continental System, a new army, and 
involvement in the 1809 and 1812 campaigns. Note that these 
measures are distinctly military; the Continental System was 
simply another element of the trade war against Napoleon's 
tenacious English antagonist. Domestic issues, such as the 
introduction of a bureaucracy based on merit, reform of 
education, and the destruction of the established order had 
already begun under Montgelas; no French initiative was 
needed. Of all the external impositions, the financial 
changes imparted by the Continental System were perhaps the 
most noteworthy and beneficial for Bavaria. 
uWoolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, vii. The 
French idea of "civilization" was distinctly Gallic, 
conceived by the French to indicate the level of perception 
in society. French leaders and thinkers felt that the ideas 
of the French Revolution would help to elevate the nature of 
German society. See Stuart Woolf, "French Civilization and 
Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire," Past and Present, vol 
124, 1989, 96-97. 
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Prior to the Continental System's debut, Montgelas' 
ministries had done what it could to encourage fiscal 
growth. The problem was distressing. Karl Theodor had left 
the treasury bankrupt and a debt of over a million florins. 
Minister of Finance Hompesch spent much of his time trying 
to desperately salvage Bavaria's economy. Based on reports 
by the pollzeidirektor Hock in 1807, Bavarian taxes raised 
17 million florins annually. Probable yearly debits 
numbered 6.8 million florins, though this figure is 
uncertain. Including pensions, benefices, and the costs of 
rearing a new administration, the true amount was probably 
much higher. Many towns, in fulfilling their tax 
requirements, had to dip into future budgets. A French 
agent noted that Bamberg and Ansbach had used up their money 
for the next four years.12 
Before his death in 1809 Hompesch diligently 
reorganized state finances. Proposing a plan inspired by 
the work of Colbert and Gaudin of France, Hompesch suggested 
a four part plan: the abolition of pecuniary privileges, 
the nationalization of tax control, the unification of land, 
and the centralization and consolidation of the debt. To 
this end Hompesch wanted to "re-introduce order into the 
manipulation of public moneys" and to refuse to invest in 
12Dunan, Napoleon et l'Allemagne, 174. 
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anything unnecessary and non-utilitarian.13 Though his 
vision was admirable, his successes were limited. Hompesch 
cut the fat from royal spending, curtailing Max Joseph's 
extravagant habits. He kept tight control on the spending 
of the Staatsconferenz and new bureaus, though he had little 
jurisdiction over the smaller budgets of towns and cities. 
Hompesch also fixed the salaries for the civil service 
employees according to their occupation.14 Despite these 
successes, much more, especially concerning taxation, was 
needed. 
Upon gaining direct control of finances in 1806, 
Montgelas applied great force to reorganizing. He further 
modified the finance ministry and its subordinate bureaus, 
streamlining them and assigning men of quality to important 
fiscal posts. In 1807 all internal tariffs were abolished.15 
Compensation from secularization and land redistribution 
lessened the fiscal burden, but much of the problem remained 
in the outmoded tax system, which was not changed until 
1808. Previously, taxes had been levied according to the 
hofhuss system of land assessment, a holdover from the Holy 
Roman Empire, based on the law of 1445. Hofhuss rates were 
levied based on the demands for ploughing of each 
13Dunan, Napoleon et l'Allemagne, 180-181,185. 
14Ibid. , 87. 
15Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 51; Ramm, Germany, 78-79. 
100 
agricultural field, measured by one peasant's average daily 
output. Because agriculture and population had changed 
little in the centuries since its conception, the hofhuss 
system remained in place. Montgelas' revolution demanded a 
better system to pay for the new army and to operate a 
modern kingdom. The units of land used in the hofhuss had 
been adjusted in 1803 to increase revenue, but the system 
was obsolete and had to be replaced.16 
Montgelas' solution was a complete reorganization of 
taxation. New, geographically-contiguous areas were 
created. Called rentbeamte, their creation erased the 
ancient pfleger and did away with the pflegerrichte system 
of collecting taxes. The rentbeamte's sole purpose was to 
function as tax divisions, not as provinces or counties. 
Taxes were to be collected based on the worth of the land, 
assessed by the members of the Kreisfinanzdirektion. 
Opposition from former pfleger and landed nobles delayed the 
complete installation of this system until June 21, 1808, 
when it was incorporated with the erection of fifteen formal 
political kreise, each with a "governor" to oversee 
taxation, laws and regulations, and the operation of the 
smaller administrative bureaus. In the interests of 
tradition and heritage, Max Joseph attempted to win the 
nobles by naming the kreise after local rivers and placing 
16Lee, Population Growth, 112. 
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each "governor" in the largest city within each area. 
Though similar to the French system of prefectures, they 
were not an imitation and differed in terms of judicial 
jurisdiction and military commitments. They did not contain 
sub-prefects nor did they mirror the system of arrondisement 
and baillis .ll These simplifications were cleaning measures, 
designed to help the state economy function smoothly. 
However, Bavarian economy and its latent industrial base 
would truly grow only under the impact of Napoleon's 
Continental System. 
The causes of the blockade of British goods are well 
documented. After Trafalgar, Napoleon was without a navy to 
challenge British dominance on the high seas. Therefore he 
resorted to a massive economic war, hoping to strangle the 
British into submission. Initiated with the Berlin Decree, 
November 21, 1806, Napoleon extended the system to all 
allied states, conquered provinces, and vanquished foes 
(Austria and Prussia) by three decrees in 1807. Woolf notes 
the importance of this action. By blockading all British 
goods and lowering her own tariffs to continental Europe, 
France inaugurated a new economic era, encouraging direct 
competition with her own markets, which were much less 
17Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 41-42; Dunan, Napoleon et 
l'Allemagne, 81-83. Dunan lists the new state circles; 
Main, Pegnits, Naab, Rezat, Altmuhl, Upper Danube, Lech, 
Regen, Lower Danube, Isar, Salzach, Iller, Inn, Eisack, and 
Adige. 
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powerful than the dynamic British economy. Continental 
states could now sell their goods aggressively. In 
addition, by removing the generally despised British 
commerial participation, the blockade provided shelter for 
Germany's embryonic industrial base to grow and compete.18 
The effects appeared quickly. One of Napoleon's ministers 
in Germany, Bacher, noted the changes. 
The new direction which colonial goods take...is 
stated to have created such activity on all roads 
leading from different places in Russia and Prussia on 
on side and through Poland and Moravia to Vienna on the 
other, as also from the Turkish provinces to the 
Austrian empire with regards to British goods 
discharged in the Levantine Ports, that the Danube will 
take the place of the Rhine, as the channel through 
which the states of the Confederation of the Rhine 
will in future provide themselves. The German 
merchants consider that this...will lead to active new 
connections between Russia, Austria, and Bavaria, and 
consequently serve to create secure routes, which will 
convey not only colonial goods to the Rhine, but also 
British products, as far as the Confederation of the 
Rhine.19 
Trade with the Kingdom of Italy became conspicuously 
important after the annexation of the Tyrol in 1806. 
Merchants conveying goods from the Orient (and, albeit 
covertly, from British colonies) entered ports along the 
Italian peninsula and negotiated the Alps through passes 
near Innsbruck. When Napoleonic strictures on foreign trade 
began to affect the Kingdom of Italy, they likewise began to 
18Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 28-29. 
19T. Bacher to Napoleon, October 2, 1810, quoted in Eli 
F. Heckscher, The Continental System: An Economic 
Interpretation, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1922) 231-232. 
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affect Bavaria. A treaty concluded between Bavaria and 
Italy, January 2, 1808, reduced tariffs between the two 
states by a full fifty percent. Upon learning of this 
treaty, Napoleon dissolved it, fearful of the competitive 
Bavarian wool-trade and of smuggled British goods entering 
Germany through the Italo-Bavarian trade routes. Woolf 
asserts this breakdown encouraged the Tyrolese Revolt of 
1809-1810 .20 
Napoleon's insistent imposition of this system upon 
allies and defeated foes alike led to a second, more 
important development for Bavaria. To humiliate and punish 
Austria for her unanticipated attack on France in the 1809 
campaign, Napoleon detached the important province of 
Illyria and the port of Trieste from Hapsburg domains, 
isolating Austria and keeping her land-locked. From that 
time a fundamental shift in trade between France and Asia 
existed, most of the goods moving into Illyria by way of the 
Ottoman land routes. To formalize this policy, Napoleon 
20Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 148. The 
Tyrolese revolt, led by the pious Catholic Andreas Hofer, 
coincided with Archduke Charles appeal to Germany in 1809 to 
join Austria in a "patriotic" war against France. The 
revolt, spurred by the disrupted Italian trade, by the 
secularization movement in Bavaria (Tyrol was heavily 
Catholic), by popular resistance to the draft, and by 
differences in nationality (Tyrolese were a proud "Gothic" 
mixture of Lombard and German), caused a great deal of 
humiliation for Max Joseph, especially when his army had 
such trouble dealing with it. When finally defeated, Hofer 
fled to Venice, where he was betrayed to the authorities. 
He was later executed. See Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten, 198-
204 and Rambaud, L'Allemagne sous Napoleon Ier, 308-330. 
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established a new trade route for goods from the Far East 
and the Levant (land-based because of French inability to 
control the Mediterranean Sea). No longer would important 
commerce from the Orient pass through Austria by way of the 
Danube valley. From November 12, 1810, goods were to be 
transported solely through the Turkish provinces of Serbia 
and Bosnia to Illyria and (for goods bound for Italy or 
Southern France) to Venice or (for goods bound for the 
Confederation of the Rhine, the Low Countries, or northern 
France) to Innsbruck in Bavarian annexed Tyrol.21 
In combination with the religious toleration which 
allowed enterprising Protestants into Wittelsbach lands, the 
result was an essential growth in Bavarian commerce. Among 
the first to benefit from the reduction of the volume of 
British colonial goods was the sugarbeet trade. 
Betteraveries, factories for producing beetsugar, sprang up 
all over Bavaria and southern Germany. Bavarian beetsugar 
rapidly and efficiently replaced colonial sugar throughout 
the Confederation. Tobacconists established cigar factories 
in major cities. The most important European commercial 
activity, textiles, grew tremendously in Bavaria, centered 
at Augsburg. Woolens had long been important to the local 
market; wool producers, uniting with cotton manufacturers, 
soon began to compete with major textile works in France. 
21Woolf Ibid., 153. 
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Ceramic production, led by John Hochgesangt, became 
important for export throughout Central Europe.22 
The repercussions of the Continental System cannot be 
underestimated. It radically altered Bavarian industry and 
consequently her economy in ways that Montgelas, despite his 
zeal for reform, could never have accomplished. Bavaria 
began to produce goods not only for herself but also for 
export on a large scale.23 Though the imposition of the 
Continental System's laws survived only as long as Napoleon, 
the long-term effect was the birth of modern Bavarian 
industry on a completely new scale. In the short-term, 
coupled with Protestant investment and administrative 
reform, the blossoming economy enabled Bavaria to comply 
with another important French demand, a larger, reorganized 
22Dunan, Napoleon et 1'Allemagne, 2 90-2 96; Woolf, 
Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 145-147; Roger Dufraisse, 
LrInfluence de la Politique Economique Napoleonienne sur 
1'Economie des Etats du Rheinbund, in Eberhard Weis and 
Elisabeth Muller-Luckner, Reformen in Rheinbundischen 
Deutschland, (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1984) 78-81, 85. 
23Bavaria was unable, however, to produce all the goods 
she needed. Many manufactured items, including steel (with 
all its products) and cheap cotton, could only be obtained 
through Great Britain. Because of such commercial needs, 
and because the blockade was nearly impossible to enforce 
throughout Europe, smuggling became a popular and prosperous 
occupation during the Napoleonic Era. See Woolf, Napoleon's 
Integration of Europe, 150-153 and particuliarly Roger 
Dufraisse, "La contrabande dans les departements reunis de 
la rive gauche du Rhin a l'epoque napoleonienne," Francia, 
1, 508-536. Dufraisse notes that some items, such as coffee 
from the West Indies, sold as high as 265% its common market 
price. 
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military, a requirement that would tax Bavaria's financial 
successes to the limit. 
If the eighteenth-century army was a monarch's best 
expression of his royal might and prestige, it assuredly 
reflected poorly on the Bavaria of Karl Theodor. The 
beleaguered Bavarian treasury, stretched to the limits by 
Karl Theodor's extravagance and waste, had difficulty 
maintaining a force greater than 10,000 men.24 Rank and file 
consisted of peasant levies, prisoners, a few mercenaries, 
and a few career soldiers, usually among the non-
commissioned officers. The officers, of course, were nobles 
appointed by the elector, frequently without merit. Count 
Rumsford had enacted some reforms, namely doing away with 
the elegant uniforms, which in the eighteenth century were 
the gentlemanly measure of state honor. Rumsford 
distributed plain, single-piece white coats to reduce costs. 
He also introduced some new artillery pieces, called 
disparagingly "Rumsford 3-pounders. "25 In the Wars of the 
First and Second Coalitions, Bavaria's impotent position as 
a minor pawn relegated its ineffective army to support roles 
for much larger and more professional Austrian and Russian 
forces. 
24Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 147. 
25Haythornethwaite, The Napoleonic Sourcebook, 142-143. 
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Acting with his usual verve and heartily supported by 
Wrede, von Triva, and Crown Prince Ludwig, Montgelas sought 
to make the army capable of defending his new state. Though 
great fiscal exertions were required to pay for the muskets, 
horses, uniforms, and equipment, Montgelas succeeded in 
fielding a modernized army. Imitating the civil service 
requirments, officers were henceforth promoted or assigned 
on basis of meritorious service. Aware that these men 
lacked experience and esprit de corps, Max Joseph created in 
1805 the Bavarian l'ecole des Cadets. Modeled on the French 
school at Saint-Cyr, Bavarian officers would go there for 
training, often by French instructors.26 Keeping with the 
spirit of martial elegance during these years, the War 
Ministry issued new cornflower blue uniforms with red 
facings. Bavarian infantry wore a distinctive, high-crowned 
black leather shako known as a raupenhelm. Thus Bavarian 
foot soldiers were distinctive on the battlefield, virtually 
the only nation of the allied contingent of Napoleon's 
Grande Armee to forego adopting a French-cut uniform.27 
The field organization of the new army, however, was 
distinctly French. Max Joseph petitioned Napoleon for a 
French general to oversee the reorganization. Napoleon's 
envoy would be General Henri Bertrand, his later companion 
26Dunan, Napoleonet l'Allemagne, 90. 
27Haythornethwaite, The Napoleonic Sourcebook, 143-144. 
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on St. Helena. Bertrand arrived in 1805 and aided the 
Bavarian military with their reorganization, forming 57 
battalions of infantry, 36 squadrons of cavalry, and 4 
artillery batteries. All were organized into brigades, 
divisions, and corps on the French model so that they might 
be more easily integrated into the command and control 
structure of the Grand Armee.28 It would remain for 
Montgelas to fill these battalions. 
With little money to spare the Savoyard minister 
resorted to conscription. Previously, in the era of limited 
warfare prior to the advent of Napoleonic grand tactics and 
total war, European armies consisted mainly of soldiers 
recruited from the "dregs of society," inducted sometimes by 
volunteering, sometimes by compulsion, and sometimes by 
trickery.29 French innovations during the revolution, namely 
mass conscription or levee en masse, revolutionized warfare. 
Consequently soldiers could be drafted in large numbers 
directly from the peasantry. It was a cheap system by which 
thousands of Frenchmen were herded into the ranks. Other 
European nations were slow to follow, their military leaders 
incapable at first of contemplating the fundamental change 
in warfare which had occurred and fearing the social impact 
28Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten, 111-113; Dunan, Napoleon 
et 1'Allemagne, 89; Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 
61-62. 
29
 J . F . C . Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789-1961, (Minerva 
Press, 1968) 20. 
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of so many armed peasants. Eventually the need for large 
armies to oppose Napoleon overrode their fears. 
Bavaria followed suit, out of a different necessity. 
The Confederation of the Rhine demanded a 30,000 man army 
from Max Joseph, the largest contingent of the league. In 
compliance, Montgelas initiated conscription, announced by 
electoral decree May 22, 1804. For this purpose Bavarian 
territory was divided into eleven military cantons. The 
police of each canton would be responsible for registering 
all men ages 16 to 40 for eligibility in the military, with 
certain exceptions. If drafted, each man would serve ten 
years.30 Through this new system of recruitment, Montgelas 
surpassed the required 30,000 men, raising the number of 
Bavarian soldiers to over 60,000 for the 1809 Danube and 
1812 Russian Campaigns. 
Unused to such measures, the poor denounced the draft. 
With all the exceptions given to other classes, they were 
singled out for service. Such policy did not improve the 
popularity of the army. Trietschke's description of the 
fanfare and bravado among the ranks is not entirely 
30Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 148. Montgelas lists all 
groups with special exception, both in terms of eligibility 
and, if willing to serve, in length of service; nobles, 
clergymen (of all religions), bourgeoisie, artisans, mine 
workers, land-owners, Jews, and Mennonites. Exceptions were 
raised with the Austrian invasion of 1809 and the 1812 
campaign; Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 164. 
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accurate.31 The soldiers' disaffection would show in 
everyday military affairs. G.W.F. Hegel recounts "an honest 
townswoman recently assured everyone that, having had two 
Russians in her house, she would prefer six French to one 
such pig; on the other hand, she would prefer 3 Russians to 
any of the 44 volunteers recently supplied by her own 
city."32 Jerome Bonaparte, in command of Bavarian divisions 
in the 1807 and 1809 campaigns, complained once that many of 
their guards would fall asleep at night, resulting in large 
numbers of them being surprised and captured by enemy 
cavalry.33 After the 1812 debacle, when over 30,000 young 
Bavarians died in the snows of Russia, public opinion turned 
sour against France. Nowhere was the change more clear than 
among the new, reconstituted Bavarian divisions which took 
the field in 1813. Napoleon wrote Max Joseph to this 
affect; "Je ne suis pas content de vos troupes; vous me 
depensez beaucoup d'argent pour les bien equipes et elles 
desertent du soir au matin."34 
31Trietschke, History of Germany, 1:417-418. 
32G.W.F. Hegel to Friedrich Niethammer, December 23, 
1813, in G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel: The Letters, (trans, by Calrk 
Butler and Christiane Seiler), (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984) 300. 
33Jerome Bonaparte, Memoirs et correspondence du Roi 
Jerome et de la Reine Catherine, 7 vols. (Paris:E. Dentu, 
1861) II;65. Jerome frequently mentions the disorder of the 
Bavarian divisions. See 11:57, 114, 142. 
34Comte Albert Beugnot, Memoirs du Comte Beugnot, 2 
vols. (Paris:E. Dentu, 1866) 11:4-5. 
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Nevertheless, on the battlefield itself the Bavarians 
performed admirably, on par with the excellent Wiirttemberg 
and Italian divisions. Usually under the direct command of 
either the Crown Prince or Feldmarschall Wrede, Max Joseph's 
soldiers stood bravely under fire, advancing boldly against 
enemy positions. Bavarian divisions participated in all the 
major campaigns after 1807, serving with particular 
distinction on the bloody Marchfeld at the Battle of Wagram, 
July 5-6, 1809.35 When studied for what it was, a 
commitment to France in return for "protection", the new 
army assumed its proper place in the general modernization 
of Bavaria. 
II 
Bavarian Domestic Changes during the Empire 
Not all of the Napoleonic demands were as heavy as the 
military commitment. Certain elements of Imperial policy 
35For more see David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of 
Napoleon, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966) 728, and 
Owen Connelly, Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military 
Campaigns, (Wilmington:SR Books, 1987) 144-149- Chandler's 
account of the Battle of Hanau, October, 1813, in which 
Wrede prematurely attempted to block the retreat of the 
French after Leipzig, illustrates the fighting capacity of 
the Bavarians nicely. Though it may appear at first they 
were defeated by rag-tag divisions made up of pitiful 
survivors of the 1813 campaign, two things must be 
remembered; Napoleon's performance as a general was nothing 
short of brilliant during the post-Leipzig period, and the 
Bavarian divisions were also survivors of the bitter 
campaign. See Chandler, 937-938. 
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were merely guidelines which allied states could interpret 
as they wished. Religious issues were one of these areas. 
Bavaria's great degree of autonomy further weakened any 
Imperial policy; Napoleon placed little importance on 
Bavarian compliance with French religious policy. Thus, 
pursuant to the religious doctrine established by Montgelas' 
administration during the electoral years, the 1805-1812 
period witnessed a continued zeal for toleration. For 
purposes of legitimacy and order the "reformation" was 
codified into law. In most states of the Napoleonic Empire, 
religion was frequently viewed solely in its political 
aspects; personal piety or local beliefs held little 
interest, especially for the military. Out of touch in many 
respects with the Catholic faith within France, Napoleon 
nonetheless attempted to mitigate the indignation Catholics 
felt toward the bitter days of the Revolution by signing the 
Concordat with the Pope. He instructed reformers in many 
states to move cautiously so as not to alienate the populace 
(the major exception, of course, being the military 
bureaucracy in Spain). On the whole, excepting the 
mandatory mediatization of the ecclesiastical estates 
demanded by Napoleon at the Treaty of Luneville, French 
policy did not mirror the fervor for toleration in Bavaria.36 
36Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 206-215. 
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Where the Jews are concerned, however, Napoleon 
attempted to create uniform policy. Jews were considered by 
most Germans to be more of an ethnic problem than a 
religious one, and general European opinion was nearly 
always against them. Keeping with the policies of extending 
French "civilization" to the occupied and allied 
territories, Napoleon, himself somewhat anti-Semitic, issued 
a set of restrictions on the Jews, May 30, 1806. For a ten-
year duration, Jews were to undergo scrutiny by French 
officials, restricting their ability to buy and sell, to 
worship, and limiting their places of residence. The goal 
of these restrictions was to assimilate Jews in French 
culture and to rid them of their "vices." Similarly to 
Bavaria, tests were administered to see which Jews were 
"useful" in the fields of finance and business. These 
would, of course, be granted limited exceptions.37 For the 
most part, these laws only took effect in the satellite 
kingdoms and the annexed provinces. They did, however, set 
an acceptable tone for the remainder of the Empire. 
Montgelas' administration continued to follow its own 
course on religious reformation. After shearing the 
temporal power of the Catholics, it set about tailoring its 
church-state policies. Restrictions on the power of the 
bishops were codified as time went on, specifically 
37Woolf, "French Civilization and Ethnicity," 116-118. 
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concerning civil and criminal cases, marriage and divorce, 
and education. As far as the Protestants were concerned, 
most of their freedoms had already been granted before Max 
Joseph's coronation as Bavaria's first king. The economic 
results have already been discussed. The reforms made the 
annexation of largely Protestant lands much easier and on 
the whole were being accepted well in Bavarian towns. The 
book censor Westenrieder wrote in January 1809 that there 
had been a great many Protestant funeral processions openly 
seen in the city, something that simply did not occur before 
1799. The arrival of the Protestant nationalist Johann 
Gottlieb von Herder in the Upper Palatinate aroused 
considerable praise for the administration.38 
All the legislation, electoral and royal, issued on 
behalf of the Protestants and against the Catholics was 
codified by the first Organic Law, issued March 24, 1809. 
The edict enumerated all rights, public and private, 
religious and secular, established by all prior edicts. 
Lutheran, Calvinist, and Catholic churches were by law the 
only recognized forms of Christian faith. Their relations 
to one another were listed in detail. The Catholic church 
was further restricted, though this would be the final 
attack upon them; no longer could they receive income in 
any form (rents, taxes, or dues) derived from their 
38Higby, The Religious Policy, 136, 138. 
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ownership of remaining lands and estates; privileges, 
dispensations, immunities, exemptions, and benefices were 
all the purview of the state, not the Holy See or local 
bishopric; marriages would henceforth be regulated by the 
state though the ceremonies were to be administered by the 
churches; and all criminal crimes, even if involving only 
clergymen, would be tried by the royal courts.39 All prior 
restrictions were enumerated and codified. The 1809 Organic 
Law was the penultimate act in the "Bavarian Refomation." 
Jewish emancipation was the final religious issue dealt 
with by the Montgelas' government. Thanks in large part to 
Christopher von Aretin's benevolent appeals for universal 
emancipation, Jewish rights began to receive increased 
attention from the administration. Max Joseph allowed 
Aretin to publicly announce, September 6, 1809, that "we 
have resolved... upon the goal of leading back the numberous 
class of Jewish inhabitants of our kingdom from the harmful 
serpation in which they live apart from other citizens...." 
Though prejudice toward Jews remained too strong for full 
implemenation of Aretin's liberal ideas, royal legislation 
did grant many changes. On March 16, 1808, the leibzoll, 
the annual 20-florin per family tax administered only upon 
Jews, was formally lifted.40 The first Organic Law in 1809 
39Ibid. , 131-132, 292; Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 124. 
40Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 139. 
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guaranteed their religious rights would not be subject to 
interference if kept private. It was not until the second 
Organic Law, June 10, 1813, that reforms on their behalf 
were formally codified. 
The 1813 act established Jewish rights as citizens in 
respect to duties to state; concerning rights and 
privileges they were still only "partial" citizens. Their 
numbers were limited; no further immigration would be 
permitted. Their existence, though nominally no longer 
confined to ghettoes, was restricted to their current 
residences. Marriage was only allowed if the Jewish 
population did not exceed present numbers and if the husband 
could support a family without resorting to "petty trades."41 
These reforms would be the limit of Bavarian reforms on 
their behalf. Viewed as an ethnic anomoly by the Bavarian 
people, they were regarded with too much animosity to be 
allowed further freedoms. Herein can be seen a major 
limitation of Montgelas' reforms. His own moderate 
enthusiasm for Jewish emancipation was insufficient to 
overcome his fear of popular recriminations limited his 
amity toward the Jews. Indeed, had it not been for 
41Montgelas, 140-141; Vedeler, "The Genesis of 
Toleration," 482-483; Higby, 145-147. Bavaria was among the 
only Confederation states to grant citizenship to the Jews, 
though by no means were Montgelas' reforms on the cutting 
edge of Jewish emancipation. Westphalia is an excellent 
example. See Helmut Berding, "L'Emancipation des juifs dans 
la Confederation du Rhin," Revue de l'Institut Napoleon, 
vol:139, 1982, 52-54. 
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Christopher von Aretin, much less might have been 
accomplished. 
During this period education, no longer the sole domain 
of the church, underwent its own revolution, though not to 
great success. The clergy having been eliminated it still 
remained for the state to find a better substitute. 
Bavaria's approach to the subject was decidedly bourgeoisie, 
leaning heavily on higher education in an attempt to 
parallel the great German universities of the north. A 
great many noteworthy names were summoned or lured to 
Bavaria. Karl von Savigny arrived at the University of 
Landshut in 1808 to lecture on Roman law. Frederick 
Theirsch commanded one of Father Jahn's gymansiums in 
Munich, becoming a member of the Academy of Science in 1809, 
over which the enlightened F.H. Jacobi presided. Anselm von 
Feuerbach also taught at Landshut.42 These men lent great 
prestige to the upper echelon of Bavarian education. 
Yet it was among the poor and middle class that 
education reform needed the greatest assistance. Friedrich 
Niethammer assumed the post of state commissioner of 
education, heading the zentralschulrat under Montgelas' 
Ministry of the Interior. He and his good friend, the 
philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, who taught high school in the 
42Vedeler, "The Genesis of Toleration," 492ff63; C.W. 
Crawley, editor, The New Cambridge Modern History; volume 
IX: War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval, 1793-1803, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965) 390. 
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newly acquired town of Bamberg, attempted to reform lower 
education in a progressive manner. On every level it seemed 
the state was against them. Other concerns drained the 
lifeblood of education, finances, and simply too little 
money was earmarked for local schools. Funds accumulated 
from the sale of church lands was supposed to go to the 
Central School Fund in Munich, but only 110,000 gulden made 
it that far, the rest being diverted toward other pressing 
needs.43 Hegel voiced concern his discovery that: 
...funding for the schools is thus also 
chronically deficient...the minute one requests 
something for it, the hue and cry goes out that the 
insufficiency is due to advances from the education 
fund to support the clergy. Immediate needs have been 
taken care of from available means... 
The same letter also reveals that, despite Montgelas' 
sincere attempts to ensure the smooth operation of his new 
bureaucracy, at times the cogs jammed: 
You will not have been exactly surprised at our 
dawdling in regard to the public school system, since 
you know in general that you have had to deal first 
with the people of Nuremburg, second with civil 
authorities and clergy, and third with people who for 
five years have grown accustomed to being inactive, who 
are surprised that something is indeed to be done.44 
Little headway was made. Ironically, it would be 
church-sponsored Sunday Schools, established primarily by 
43Lee, Population Growth, 
amount to be 300,000 florins, 
29, 1807, Hegel: The Letters, 
346. Hegel believed the 
Hegel to Niethammer, August 
141. 
44Hegel to Niethammer, Easter Day, April 10, 1814, 
Hegel: The Letters, 303-304. 
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the Protestants, which would unintentionally help lower the 
illiteracy rate. These schools were intended as secondary 
education for boys between the ages of twelve and eighteen 
who wished to enter into trades.45 In the course of the 
religious and professional training, these apprentices were 
taught to read and write. In all, Montgelas education 
reform was a failure. Too little funding and too much focus 
on embellishing the Academy of Science and the Universities 
left many Bavarians unable to read. Consequently crime, 
vagrancy, and begging continued to be great concerns. 
In attempting to diminish these crimes, Montgelas court 
system failed on one major point: patrimonial, hereditary 
justice. Landowners, still favored by the backward system 
of feudal peasantry, continued to administer justice on 
their own terms. This victory was their greatest against 
Montgelas and they were not about to relinquish their 
rights. Crown funds were also inadequate to erect a 
definitive judicial system.46 The groundbreaking work of the 
electoral period was completely renovated January 1, 1809, 
by the Untergerichte, a tribunal which included urban 
courts, seigneurial courts, the appelationsgerichte or 
appeal court, and, as the highest body, the cour de 
cassation which replaced the old appeal courts in Munich, 
45Lee, Population Growth, 343. 
46Klang, "Bavaria and the War of Liberation," 31. 
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Bamberg, and Ulm.47 Though an expedient measure, the 
seigneurial courts in particular failed. The Untergericht 
never supplanted the the power of patrimonial justice. 
The crowning achievement for Montgelas during this 
period of consolidation and codification was the 
Constitution of 1808. Roughly based on the constitution of 
Jerome Bonaparte's Westphalia, the Bavarian charter was not 
an altogether new document; rather, like most of the work 
done in these years, it was a codification and 
clarification. Many of the reforms during the electoral 
period grew out of unwritten proclamations or hasty edicts. 
It was time to regroup, to solidify the admirable 
workmanship of the first nine years. Other factors, too, 
made a constitution necessary. As in the case of justice, 
the nobles had recovered from their initial shock and were 
beginning to oppose reform more firmly. As was the general 
trend in European states during these years, the upper class 
was beginning its counter-assault, the reaction against 
revolution. To codify the laws would aid in weakening such 
an attack. A constitution would give the government a firm 
foundation from which to argue their point.48 It would also 
help quell fears of radical revolution by giving a semblance 
47Dunan, Napoleon et l'Allemagne, 84. 
48John Breuilly, "State Building, Modernization, and 
Liberalism from the Late Eighteenth Century to Unification: 
German Peculiarities," European History Quarterly, Vol. 22, 
1992, 265. 
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of order. Bavaria had not experienced a bloody revolution 
as France had, but the fear of Jacobin clubs and secret 
societies was common among both the bourgeoisie and the 
nobility. Therefore both the reformers and their opposition 
would benefit. There was more to come. In addition, fear of 
Dalberg's potential strength as "Prince-Primate" moved the 
Bavarians to proceed with the drafting of the first minor 
state constitution during the Napoleonic Wars. Dalberg had 
presented plans for a confederation-constitution. Max 
Joseph and Montgelas wanted no part of such political body.49 
The Constitution of 1808 was thus preemptive, showing that 
Bavaria could stand alone and did not need the confederation 
to legitimize her existence as a kingdom. 
As with most of these reforms, the Constitution of 1808 
was at first a royal edict issued May 1, 1808, later 
published May 25.50 It firmly established Max Joseph as an 
enlightened despot. In the interests of democracy and the 
rights of man it was declared that all Bavarian citizens 
were guaranteed freedom of conscience and security of person 
and property. The Constitution was, however, democratic 
only in theory. Franchise was extended only to those nobles 
49Ibid. , 266; Karl Mockl, "Die bayerische Konstitution 
von 1808," in Weis and Muller-Luckner, Reformen im 
rheinbiindischen Deutschland, 151-166; Kraehe, Metternich' s 
German Policy, 1:60. 
50Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 69; Mockl, "Die bayerische 
Konstitution von 1808," 153. 
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and bourgeois landowners paying the highest taxes, chosen as 
electors for life by the king. They would elect members 
from each administrative kreise to sit with representatives 
hand-picked by the "governors" in a unicameral legislature. 
Each "representative" would serve a six-year term. This 
body could enact legislation which was always subject to 
scrutiny by the king and his ministers. Mostly, like the 
conseil d'etat before it, debate was their primary concern, 
concentrating on the budget and finances. Max Joseph could 
assemble, dismiss, or dissove the body at will.51 
Uniformity, centralization, and codification were the 
key points. All prior legislation concerning conscription, 
draft exemptions, taxation, administrative kreise, the 
staatskonferenz, conseil d'etat, and generallandesdirektion 
were made permanent. The ministries of finance, foreign 
affairs, and the interior were to be reorganized into 
distinct bureaus, each with one head, responsible for all 
activities of his section. All privileges, noble and 
clerical, were formally abolished, as were the Imperial 
estates to which they formerly belonged. The judiciary was 
made independant of the legislature and not subject to its 
direction, though it was responsible to the king and the 
staatskonferenz. Each judge was to be named by the current 
monarch and were responsible to direct the police in 
51Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 73. 
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arrests, fines, and prison terms. The Constitution 
established for the royal succession, coming of age, and 
marriage of royal family members. Freedom of the press was 
also declared. All were subject to "la prerogative 
royal e.1,52 
Bavaria's first constitution was a sincere, somewhat 
awkward effort to reach the upper classes disrupted by nine 
years of rapid reorganization. "Allerdings hatte sie im 
Unterschied zur Konstitution von 1808 weniger den Charakter 
der Erneuerung als den des Ausgleichs," writes Karl Mockl.53 
It did nothing, however, to truly emancipate the agrarian 
peasants still languishing under feudal bonds. It also 
failed to institute a firm penal code; this would remain a 
problem until Anselm Feuerbach wrote a workable system in 
1813.54 In time, demands of the resurgent and victorious 
allies would call for the resignation of Montgelas as 
incompatible with the reaction against reform and 
rationalism. It would simultaneously require a new 
constitution in 1818 to preserve Bavaria's existence in the 
reactionary Metternich order. For the Napoleonic empire, 
however, it was an honest attempt at enlightened rule. 
52Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 70-75. 
53Mockl, "Die bayerische Konstitution von 1808," 166. 
54Ramm, Germany, 77. 
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By 1812 the revolution was complete. What did it 
accomplish? It was not the "total revolution" declared by 
Anselm Feuerbach; in some areas it fell far short of its 
goals. In many respects, Montgelas' goal was outmoded 
before it was finished, for the time of the absolute monarch 
in Europe was at an end. The disillusionment of Feuerbach 
and others from the allure of the French Empire, accelerated 
by the 1812 debacle, represented a fundamental change that 
would result, within a year, in Max Joseph's revolt from the 
Napoleonic hegemony. An analysis of Montgelas' program in 
long-term European history will reveal a great deal about 
its importance and its faults. 
Conclusion 
As Napoleon's rise had aided Montgelas in the 
realization of his plans, so was the Savoyard minister's 
destiny interwoven with the fall of the French conqueror. 
After the 1812 debacle, when over 30,000 young Bavarians 
died in the snows of Russia, public opinion turned against 
France. Max Joseph's support, also so very crucial to 
Montgelas, began to waver. He saw that Napoleon was not 
invincible. The tide which had been continually washing out 
of France since 1796 began to turn. 
I 
The End of the Napoleonic Hegemony 
Much has been said of the so-called War of Liberation 
that ensued. The 1813 campaign with its titanic culmination 
at Leipzig has been hailed by Treitschke and others as the 
awakening of the German spirit. Philosophers and historians 
alike debated the influence of Fichte, Herder, Miiller and 
others. Some, like Hans Kohn and Freiderick Meinecke, have 
developed their theories on nationalism around the words of 
such men, proclaiming that it was the work of Fichte and 
Goethe that caused Germany to suddenly (and consciously) 
realize its possible future.1 But all in all it was 
:Hans Kohn's detailed works on nationalism during this 
period are constantly skewed by his desire to make something 
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political reality and not the fervor of the masses that led 
Max Joseph and the other monarchs of the Confederation of 
the Rhine to defect to the allies as surely as they had 
joined France in 1805. 
Napoleon's fall revealed the Confederation as the paper 
tiger it truly was. German fervor for French ideology had 
long since lost its initial luster; during the spring of 
1813 it was becoming clear that an annulment of the Franco-
Bavarian alliance was in sight. The people began to murmur 
that the price paid in Bavarian lives for French 
"protection" was far too high. Indeed, the newly 
reconstituted Bavarian divisions which rejoined Napoleon in 
March and April exhibited much less zeal than their 
predecessors. 
Montgelas' own position within the government was 
becoming tenuous. General von Wrede, never a supporter of 
Napoleon, began to advocate negotiation with Prussia and 
out of nothing. It is fairly obvious from contemporary 
accounts that the philosophers and romantics of the 
preceding twenty years had a much smaller effect than Kohn 
would like to admit. Nonetheless, his works are an 
insightful study into the ideas of Fichte, Herder, the 
brothers Schlegel, and others. See Hans Kohn, Prelude to 
Nation-states: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815, 
(Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.) 1967; Hughes, 
Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945, 1988, and 
Freidrich Meinecke, The Age of German Liberalism, 1795-1815, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press) 1957. For an 
excellent and oft-overlooked refutation of the Kohn and 
Meinecke theses, see Robert M. Berdahl, "New Thoughts on 
German Nationalism," American Historical Review, vol. 77, 
no. 1, 1972, pp. 65-80. Berdahl attacks the idea of German 
intellectual culture forming national consciousness in the 
absence of real, political action. 
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Russia, joined later that summer by a resurgent Austria. 
Montgelas, however, was unsure that path was the correct 
one. His memoirs fall silent on this point; it is difficult 
to ascertain whether Montgelas was acting in the hopes of 
simple political survival or for the welfare of the state. 
He believed, as did most of his supporters, that the return 
of Austrian power would spell disaster for his reforms. 
Never as popular as his sovereign, Montgelas suffered under 
the attacks of his detractors, particularly from the exiled 
embezzler Karl von Reisach, who, under the approving eye of 
Baron Stein penned a vehement pamphlet condemning the new 
aristocracy in Munich.2 This vituperation struck a chord 
with the landed gentry and former reichsritterschaft, ever 
anxious to hamper Montgelas in any way. As the summer 
wore on and Napoleon failed to achieve the decisive 
"thunderclap," Wrede and others increasingly called on Max 
Joseph to sever the Gallic ties and return to an 
understanding with Austria. Early in October, while 
Montgelas hesitated and fretted in Munich, Wrede forced the 
king's hand and the Bavarian troops received orders to join 
the Allies. Max Joseph had come to terms with the Prussian 
minister Hardenberg, who had agreed to allow Bavaria to 
retain her possessions. The threat of Austrian invasion, 
real or imagined, had been too great to ignore. Just as 
2Klang, Bavaria and the War of Liberation, 30. 
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with its conception, the Confederation of the Rhine lived or 
died not by the will of Bonaparte alone, but with the 
loyalty of the Bavarian crown. At the time of the "Battle 
of the Nations," at Leipzig, October 16-18, 1813, only 
Saxony remained a French satellite, the other states having 
made separate agreements with the Allies. 
It seems that the decision to defect was taken by those 
in the highest levels of government, in the court and 
palace, in the conseil d'etat and the provincial bureaus. 
As they had so often proved in the years since Max Joseph's 
accession, the commoners of Bavaria remained on the whole 
impassive bystanders. There had been no popular outcry for 
reform in 1799; it had been directed by and desired wholly 
by the upper middle class. The same could be said of 1813; 
the movement had come mostly from above. Despite what 
Treitschke and others would believe, there was no popular 
outcry. The prolific Hegel remarked when the "liberators" 
passed by "...if par hasard there are any liberated 
individuals to be seen, I myself will stand up and watch!"3 
Reaction ranged from moderation to coolness. 
The next years saw Bavaria survive, due more to 
Prussian fear of a Austria than to the power of the 
Wittelsbach throne. Montgelas, however, did not long 
survive. His cool reception of the "liberators" was known 
3Hegel, The Letters, 291. 
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throughout the country, and after 1814 the men who aided in 
the defection of Bavaria were most in favor. The pressures 
became too much; with the best of his ministers dead and 
his unofficial French patron overthrown, Montgelas remaining 
time was short. In 1817, claiming ill-health, he resigned 
from his position, though he remained an inactive advisor to 
his friend the king for several years. The following year, 
1818, marked the passage of Bavaria's second constitution, 
the first liberal constitution in Germany, granting a 
measure of democracy, including popular elections and rights 
for peasants, freedoms that Montgelas' codification of 1808 
never even envisioned. 
II 
Bavaria and the Napoleonic Empire 
European historians have labelled the German states 
during the Napoleonic era as "victims." That label holds 
true particularly in the loss of young lives on the 
battlefield, lost in wars their sovereigns had no choice but 
to join. 
Bavaria's case is different. Though she had little say 
in the greater sphere of European politics, her large size 
and considerable population gave her leverage in the 
struggle. States such as Kleves-Berg or Hesse-Darmstadt had 
meager resources, and thus their victimization gained them 
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nothing. In the end, these states lost the paltry 
independence their scarce resources gave them, consumed in 
the Germany of the early 19th Century, dominated by growing 
Prussia and waning Austria. But Bavaria's assets meant her 
ruler could negotiate the terms of his service, a fact that 
is overlooked in many histories of the period. Napoleon 
needed a Bavarian corps in his army, but Max Joseph 
benefited more from this arrangement; when the Austrians 
returned in 1813, he now had a sizable, organized military 
force the Hapsburgs could ill afford to fight. It must not 
be overemphasized, but Bavaria's new-found military strength 
played a definite role in her survival during the Age of 
Metternich. 
Likewise, the Bavaria of Napoleonic Europe finally 
entered the industrial age. Along with the rest of Germany, 
Bavarian industry flourished in the next decades. The pre-
conditions for this explosion exist in Montgelas' reform of 
the bureaucratic and social systems of the state, allowing 
for the immigration of Protestant entrepreneurs and removing 
the boundaries to economic growth. Napoleon's Anglophobic 
trade war fueled the initial drive, forcing the Bavarian 
industry into competition with the other German states and 
Northern Italy, and, with her large pool of unemployed 
manpower and larger resources to draw upon, Bavaria was able 
to turn Britain's short-term exclusion from the Rhine and 
Danube into its gain. 
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The question remains; to whom does the credit go? 
Certainly it has been made clear that the conditions for 
reform existed before Austria's debacle at Ulm in 1805, 
which brought the French to Munich to stay for some time. 
But it is also apparent that without the protective umbrella 
of French power Bavaria could not have stood up to the 
Reich. Without the dismantling of the entangling 
obligations and authority of the Holy Roman Empire, 
Montgelas could not have consolidated his lord's holdings 
and reunited isolated Bavarian possessions. It is not too 
bold to state that without the ideas of the French 
Revolution, Bavaria could not have moved in the direction it 
did. The reactionary policy taken by Max Joseph smiled 
favorably upon the small kingdom. 
Bavaria's story also does much to refute the role of 
nationalism during these years. To many citizens of Munich, 
Ulm, and Augsburg, Bavaria was the only Germany they ever 
knew--as illustrated in the conversation between a father 
and his liberal son in the poet Heinrich von Kleist's 
Germania. 
"Tell me child, who are you?" 
"A German." 
"A German? You are joking. You were born in 
Meissen, and the country to which Meissen belongs is 
called Saxony!" 
"I was born in Meissen and the country to which 
Meissen belongs is called Saxony, but my fatherland, 
the country to which Saxony belongs, is Germany, and 
your son, my father, is a German." 
"You dream. I do not know any country to which 
Saxony belongs, unless perhaps the Rhenish 
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Confederation. Where can I find this Germany of which 
you talk; where is it situated?"4 
The "revolution" in Bavaria was a decidedly bourgeoisie 
event. In general, the populace displayed an overly passive 
response to Montgelas' reforms, exhibiting little of the 
fervor described by German nationalist historians of the 
later 19th Century. Since this is so, the men who led 
Bavaria into the French hegemony and then those who helped 
lead it back into the allied camp were upper middle class, 
the 19th-century novus homo of the German states. Most of 
the intellectuals whom Treitschke and others credited with 
leading the patriotic drive toward unity did not appeal to 
the Bavarian reformers. Fichte, considered to be weak on 
history and economy, believed international trade was 
dangerous and entangling, to be avoided until the state had 
completely exploited its own resources.5 Friedrich 
Schlegel's cultural nationalism was completely unconcerned 
with the concept of state, central to Montgelas' ideas.6 
And one of the foremost of the Romantic political 
philosophers, Adam Miiller rejected capitalism altogether as 
antisocial and unethical, unequivocally rejecting all 
4Heinrich von Kleist, Germania, translated in Kohn, 
Prelude to Nation-States, 197. 
5H.T. Betteridge, "Fichte's Political Ideas: A 
Retrospect," German Life and Letters, vol. I, 1936-1937, 
295 . 
6Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States, 180-181. 
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reformers who wanted to throw away traditions such as those 
embodied by the Reich. If indeed the measure of Bavaria's 
nationalism lies in the hearts of the new leaders of the 
southern German state, then the intellectuals of the early 
century certainly shared little of their traits. 
Bavaria's revolution, then, belongs to Bavaria alone. 
Credit for the change can not only be given to Napoleon, who 
tore away the phantom chains of the Holy Roman Empire, but 
also to Montgelas and Max Joseph, the former for being a man 
of vision and energy and the other for having the good 
fortune of being a man with extraordinary political luck. 
Standing alone, in its most restricted sense, their story 
epitomizes the nature of change coming not only in Munich 
but in Vienna, Berlin, and all the German capitals. In a 
much larger scope, it is an oft-overlooked part of Germany's 
history in the early 19th-century and deserves to be 
explored, not as a footnote to the rise of the unified 
German state or as a minor satellite of the vast Napoleonic 
dynasty but as an interesting and illuminating glimpse into 
the fundamental changes that would help to lead Germany into 
the modern world. 
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